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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to explore a major
implication of Bern's "self-perception" explanation of
cognitive dissonance phenomena and the ramifications of
this implication for the "interpersonal simulation"
technique employed to test self-perception theory.

In

a "forced compliance" paradigm experiment self-perception
theory maintains that for the 3 perception of his counterattitudinal behaviour and its immediate controlling con
ditions are the only salient factors eliciting dissonance
like phenomena.

Accordingly, premanipulation attitude

(the S !s original attitude before engaging in counterattitudinal behaviour) is non-salient to the experimental
phenomenology.

Consequently, Beni concludes that preroan-

ipulation attitude is irrelevant information for an
external observer-subject in an "interpersonal simulation"
of a "forced compliance" paradigm experiment.
The present study employs a partial replication of
Ben and AcConnell's (1970) original efforts to test the
salience of premanipulstion attitude position,

v/ithin

a "forced-compliance framework 3 s were requested to
recall their original attitude position on an issue after
writing relevant counterattitudinal essays as a test of
the salience of initial attitude position.
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The S population was divided into two groups: those
for whom the issue in question was of high importance
(was highly relevant and Ss expressed strong commitment)
and those for whom the issue was of low importance.
Generalizing from cognitive dissonance theory, it was
predicted that high importance Ss would produce greater '
recall error after counterattitudinal behaviour than low
importance Ss.
A separate component experiment, utilizing a tradit
ional attitude change measure as the outcome variable,
was included to insure dissonance phenomena had occured
and provide phenomenological comparison with the recall
experiment.

Again, Ss were divided on the importance

variables and predictions were based on cognitive dis
sonance theory.
The results show that dissonance phenomena did occur
in both experiments since os writing counterattitudinal
essays did make greater recall error and attitude change
than control Ss who did not write relevant .essays.

The

main hypotheses which predict interaction effects between
the importance of attitude variables with high importance
experimental Ss producing greater attitude change and
recall error than low importance experimentals were not
supported as stated.

However, a statistically significant

interaction effect, reverse to that predicted, did occur
in the recall experiment.

Thus, low importance experimental

Ss made greater recall error in the direction of positions
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argued in the essays than high importance experimentals
or controls.

In the experiment with change scores as

the dependent variable, it was found that high importance
experimental Ss tended to change their attitudes more
than low importance experimentals as predicted, although
this difference did not reach statistical significance.
Moreover, when variance due to differences in initial
attitude position as a co-variant were included in stat
istical analysis, the results show statistically significant
differences in dissonance effect between the two exper
imental treatment groups (with high importance 3s demon
strating greater change than low importance Ss) when
strength of commitment was the measure of importance.
■These results were discussed in terms of their rele
vance to Bern's theory and his "interpersonal simulation"
methodology.

It was concluded that premanipulation att

itude is a salient factor in producing dissonance-like
effects in a "forced compliance" experiment for some ind
ividuals.

hamely, those individuals- for whom the attitude-

issue of focus in the experiment is of high importance.
Thus, the results tend to be non-supportive of Bern's pos
ition.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Behaviourism as a school of psychology, defines its
purpose as: the objective, systematic investigation of
observable responsive activity in organisms without ref
erence to consciousness (Watson, 1930).

The behavioural

school within this theoretical and methodological frame
work, has made exceptional progress towards the tradit
ional goal of psychology as a science - the prediction
and control of human behaviour.
The behavioural approach has had notable effects on
many areas of psychology.

Its influence on any g'iven

aspect of the study of the human organism generates const
ructive theoretical and research productivity, and approp
riate controversy.

Recently, even cognitive theory has

tangled with the behavioural influence.

For example,

Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1937 5
1958> 1962, 1964) has had such an encounter through the
theory and research generated by D. J. Bern's self-perception
theory (Bern, 1953, 1967, 1967).

Predictibly, Bern's alter

native explanation of cognitive dissonance phenomena has
generated a good deal of controversy.

This paper is an

attempt to provide data which is significant for one of

1
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the ma^or controversial aspects of Bern's theory and meth
odology, specifically his premise that a person has no
knowledge of his attitudes (or beliefs) until he observes
himself engaged in behaviours relevant to such attitudes that prernanipulation attitude ratings are not salient to
post manipulation attitude ratings.
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THEORETICAL REVIEW
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is a
particularly important example of a family of theories termed
cognitive consistency or balance theories.

The common element

of these theories is that they postulate the human organism
strives to maintain a consistency or balance among its cognitive
elements.
The basic units of dissonance theory are cognitive elements.
In Festinger's terms cognitive elements are "knowledges" about
various objects, facts, circumstances, behaviours etc.

Beliefs,

attitudes, and opinions are included in the term "knowledges".
Two cognitive elements may have relevant or irrelevant relation
to one another.
and consonant.

Relevant relations are of two types, dissonant
A consonant relation implies that one element

follows from another.

A dissonant relation (here, the opposite

of consonant) implies an inconsistency between cognitive
elements.

According to Festinger, (1957)» "two elements are

in dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the
obverse of one element would follow

from the other".

For

example, one's knowledge that he cowers from a fist fight is
in dissonant relation to his belief that he is a brave man,
since brave people are not afraid to defend themselves.

The

contemporaneous existence of two such opposite elements results
in an uncomfortable drive-like state referred to as dissonance.
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The Magnitude of Dissonance
The magnitude of dissonance betv/een cognitive elements
is dependent upon both the "importance” of the elements and
the proportion of relevant elements that are dissonant.

With

respect to "importance" Festinger (1957) states:
"If two elements are dissonant with one another
the magnitude of the dissonance will be a function
of the importance of the elements. The more
these elements are important to, or valued by,
the person the greater will be the magnitude of
dissonance."
Thus, for example, if a person watches a television program
of which he has previously expressed a dislike, the magnitude
of dissonance is rather weak since neither of the two elements
involved is very consequential to the person.

On the other

hand, if a student does not study for a very important exam
ination knowing that his fund of knowledge is inadequate to
pass, the magnitude of dissonance is much greater since the
elements that are dissonant are much more important to the
person.
The magnitude of dissonance also increases with an incr
ease in the proportion of cognitive elements in dissonant
relation.

For example, the more reasons known to a smoker to

stop smoking, the greater the dissonance created by continued
smoking (Festinger, 1957).
The magnitude of diss on anc e is gre at er the less the
justification as, for example, the amount of positive or neg
ative inducement used to get a person to engage in dissonant
behaviour (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959).

Thus, a person

will experience less dissonance if he is paid ^'50 to argue
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against his beliefs than if he is given $.50.

Moreover, the

magnitude of dissonance also increases the more the person
perceives he had a real choice in commiting the discrepent
behaviour (Brehm and Cohen, 1962).

Thus* if a person is allowed

to choose whether or not he will co-operate in a behaviour
discrepent with an attitude he will experience greater dissonance
when performing the task than if he had been forced to perform
the task.
Dissonance Reduction
Since the existence of dissonance enduces psychological
tension or discomfort it will '’motivate" (Festinger, 1958) the
person to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.
Moreover, the strengths of the pressures to reduce dissonance
functions directly with respect to the magnitude of dissonance.
Dissonance reduction can be achieved in any of these ways:
changing a behavioural cognitive element, changing an
environmental cognitive element, or adding new cognitive
elements (Festinger, 195?)*

When the smoker stops smoking due

to increased information about the deleterious effects of
smoking he is changing a behavioural cognitive element to
reduce dissonance.

The individual who distorts the perceived

political orientation of candidate in order to justify voting
for him is changing an environmental cognitive element.

Finally,

the individual adds cognitive elements to reduce dissonance
when, as an example, the smoker reads material critical of the
research linking cancer to smoking.
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The Forced-Compliance Paradigm
There are essentially two experimental paradigms designed
to test dissonance theory, the "free-choice" paradigm and the
"forced-complianee" paradigm.

Since this study is directly

concerned only with the latter paradigm it alone will be
discussed here.
The most frequently cited evidence supporting cognitive
dissonance theory comes from an experimental procedure termed
the "forced-compliance" paradigm.

The paradigm tests the

theoretical proposition that one of the major ways of reducing
dissonance is to change beliefs or attitudes so that they are
no longer inconsistent with behaviour.

Within this .paradigm

Ss are typically requested to engage in a task they would not
ordinarily perform such as writing an essay with a theme
contradictory to their initial attitude.

The S is usually

offered either a large or a small reward for participating
(e.g, Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959) or is given relative
freedom of choice to comply (e.g. Brehm and Cohen, 1959).

As

noted above, cognitive dissonance theory predicts that the task
or issue involved is evaluated in a more dissonance - reducing
direction the smaller the reward or the less "coerced" the S
is to perform the act (e.g. Aronson and Carlsmith, 19635 Brehm
and Cohen, 1959s Freedman, 1965).

Thus, in the counterattitudinal

essay task the S can reduce dissonance by changing his original
attitude to conform more closely to the expressed attitude in
the essay.

Greater attitude change is predicted to occur as

a function of the amount of inducement and/or freedom of choice
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to comply.

.

Such predictions have frequently been supported

in terms of group data.
Furthermore, Festinger, (1957) predicts that degree of
dissonance reducing behaviour in the forced compliance paradigm
(e.g. as reflected in attitude change) is a function of the
"importance”, for the S
the experiment.

of the issue or attitude of focus in

He is quite explicit on this point:

" . . . the more important the opinions or behaviour
involved, the greater will be the magnitude of
dissonance accompanying forced-compliance. . . .
The greater the importance of the opinions involved
the greater is the magnitude or reward or punish
ment necessary to elicit forced compliance and the
greater is the magnitude of the dissonance that is
created."
These predictions are frequently supported in terras of group
data (e.g. Brehm, 1956; Cohen', 1962).
Recently, Bern (1964) has offered an alternative explan
ation of dissonance phenomena within a strict behavioural
framework.

His theory (self-perception theory) utilizes

concepts derived from Skinner, (1955? 1957).

He assumes the

dissonance results to be valid but offers a radically differ
ent explanation for these effects.
Self-Perception Theory
Bern’s theory eschews any underlying processes (such as
cognitive dissonance) and attempts to analyze in stimulusresponse terms behaviour characterized as beliefs and attit
udes.

The major thesis of his theory is that:
"The functional properties of self-knowledge (e.g.
beliefs and attitudes) do not differ in any way
from the knowledge-of-others and that the ontogeny
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of self-knowledge similarly has its roots in social
interaction." (cf. Mead, 1934; Ryle, 1949; Skinner,
1953).
According to Bern's theory beliefs and attitudes constit
ute covert and overt statements involving self-knowledge and
knowledge-of-others about self and other-self knowledge.
The process involved in knowledge of otherb beliefs and att
itudes has been effectively taught by the community.

Any

inferences the individual makes about another's beliefs or
attitudes are influenced by or inferred from observed beh
aviour (verbal or otherwise) and the apparent rationale for
the behaviour.
possible.

No other effective means of inference is

For instance, the anti-war demonstrator is believed

to harbour a belief system and attitudes that are contrary to
participation in war because of his observed behaviour (i.e.
he demonstrates and shouts anti-war slogans).

The signific

ant aspect of Bern's position is that self-perception of one's
own beliefs and attitudes functions under the same controlling
conditions as the inference statements made about other's
beliefs and attitudes.

Thus, the anti-war demonstrator labels

his own attitude as "anti-war" by reference to his overt be
haviour in the same way an observer of his actions labels his
attitude "anti-war".

Furthermore, this self-perception process

used to infer private attitudes is a consequence of the social
izing communities'

t r a i n i n g in pe r c e p t i o n and description of

extra-self events and behaviours.
Thus, although it appears that covert and overt selfdescriptive statements are exclusively under "private" stimulus
control "they raay in fact remain under the discriminative
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control of the same public events which members of the community
must use in 'inferring* the individuals inner states" (Bern,
1965).
According to Bern's theory mere observation of a behaviour
is not sufficient for the observer to make statements or
inferences as to the behaviour's implications.
ipake

In order to

accurate' judgements about a unit of behaviour and its

belief-attitude implications, knowledge of the controlling
conditions

of a given behaviour

is essential.

Beliefs and Attitudes and Their Operant Qualities
Beliefs and attitudes can be classed as social operants
because they "operate" on the.environment in a functionally
equivalent way.

Operants exist within a "three term relation:

discriminative stimulus, operant response, reinforcing stimulus"
(Bern, 196^).

Therefore, the social operant is open to the

influence of two basic kinds of controlling conditions.

Its

nature and strength is dependent upon the invoking discriminative
cues and consequent reinforcement contingencies.
There are essentially two types of social operant defined
in terms of the nature of controlling stimuli; "mands and
tacts" (Skinner, 195?).

A social operant which is primarily

under the functional control of relevant, specific reinforcing
stimuli is termed a mand.

The response "please close the door"

is such an operant since only door closing behaviour will serve
as a reinforcer for it.
reinforcement.

Mands represent requests for specific

Thus commands, demands, pleas and some questions
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10
are mand-type operants.

It should be noted that it is the

functional properties of an operant, rather than its formal
properties which determines its classification (Bern, 196k)
as a mand or tact.
Thus, "My it is noisy in the hallway" may be a mand
specifying door closing behaviour as reinforcement, even though
the statements formal properties are not mandlike.
A "tact" on the other hand as defined by Bern, (1965,
following Skinner, 1957) is "a social operant which is under
discriminative stimulus control and only generalized or non
specific reinforcement control."

Thus, specific discriminative

stimuli predominate to control the evoking of a tact.

This

operant is relatively independent of its specific reinforcing
consequence.

The deprivation state of the individual for a

particular reinforcement is not crucially determinant of a
tact's occurrence.

General conversation is often consisted of

a predominance of verbal tacts which through their naming,
referring or describing function provide contact with environmental
stimuli (as the discriminative cues).

The response "My it is

noisy in the hallway" made in the hallway to others in the
hallway becomes a tact.

In this case, the most relevant

controlling stimuli of the response is the discriminative
stimulus, noise.

Assessing the verity of behaviour in terms of its beliefattitude elements involves an analysis of the controlling
stimuli of the behaviour.

The individual makes "mand-tact

discriminations" in deciding whether to accept the behavioural
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communication as representative of true belief.

As an exam

ple, consider the differential implications of the statement,
"this medicine is good" proclaimed on the one hand, by a child
joyfully downing a spoonful of medicinal syrup and on the
other, by a television-ad drug salesman.

Which of these

overtly identical statements is to be accepted as a tact?
For the child, "this medicine is good!" is a verbal-tact oper
ant since i t 'is clearly under the predominant control of the
discriminative stimulus tasty medicine.

It may be inferred

that the salesman is specifying reinforcement (Buy my med
icine!) with his statement rather than responsing to discrim
inative stimulus control of the "goodness" of the medicine.
Consequently, the tacting statement of the child is more
acceptable as representative of his true belief.

The child's

behaviour would more likely be interpreted by an observer as
indicative of true belief than the manding statement of the
salesman.
In accordance with his central thesis such mand-tact
discriminations based on observable behaviour (public or once
public) and their controlling conditions are employed in the
same way for both interpersonal and intrapersonal derivations
of belief and attitude statements.
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Self-Perception Theory and the "Forced-Compliance" Paradigm
Bern originally employed the "interpersonal replication"
(also termed "interpersonal simulation") experiment as a means
of explaining cognitive dissonance results through his theory.
A derivation of the self-perception hypothesis is that out
side observers to a cognitive dissonance experiment should
be able to duplicate the participating subject's ratings.
An "interpersonal replication" experiment simply consists of
providing "observer subjects" (OS) with a description of a
cognitive dissonance experiment.

The "observer subject" is

requested to make his own estimate of what he feels the
"participating-subjects 1" (PS) ratings would have beem.
Bern (1964-, 1965, 1967b, 1967c) found he was able to duplicate
cognitive-dissonance results in the "interpersonal replication"
experiment.

lioreover, the majority of Bern's evidence to

support his theory has been based on "interpersonal replic
ations" of cognitive dissonance experiments.
The procedures involved in "forced compliance" tests of
dissonance theory have already been described.

Results of such

studies have been generally consistent with an interpretation
based on cognitive dissonance theory.

Bor example, Festinger

and Carlsmith, (1959) in the best known study employing the
forced compliance paradigm divided 60 Ss into three experi
mental conditions and requested all Ss but the control group
to tell a waiting S
very enjoyable.

that the tasks they had just completed were

The tasks were in fact quite dull.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ss in one

13

.

experimental group were paid $20.00 for complying whereas 3's
in another group received only $1.00.
no payment.

The control S received

Consistent with.cognitive dissonance theory S s

in the $1.00 group engaged in more dissonance reducing behav
iour (personally evaluated the tasks as more enjoyable) than
did the S s paid 120.00.

The $20.00 S-s did not express attit

udes significantly different from controls.
As stated, 3em rejects the dissonance "drive" theory and
explains such "dissonance phenomena" on the basis of his
behavioural self-perception.

He would explain the Festinger-

Carlsmith, (1959) study by suggesting that if a S

were to

observe the study he, as an observer would judge S s

in the

$20.00 condition as having participated primarily to receive
the reinforcement.

Thus the $20.00 communicator was "manding"

reinforcement rather than engaging in behaviour consistent
with discriminative stimuli for that behaviour.

On the other

hand, the $1.00 communicator would be judged by an observer
as having actually liked the tasks since he related this
communication to waiting subjects for so little money.

The

verbal operant behaviour (telling the waiting S s) is judged
a tact.

Therefore, Bern would say that both the participating

3 s and the observer S s make their eventual judgements based
upon the same observed behaviour and consequently make equiv
alent attitude ratings based on the behaviour.

The typical

forced compliance results are not unexpected in Bern's theory.
The unique expectation of Bern's position is that equivalent
dissonance phenomena occur in an interpersonal replication of
a forced-compliance study.
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14
Bern, (1967b) performed such an interpersonal replication
of the Festinger Carlsmith,

(1959) experiment.

Seventy-five

college undergraduates were divided into three groups? the
$1.00, $20,00 or control condition.
All Ss listened to a tape recording which described a
college sophomore who had participated in an experiment
involving two motor tasks.
but non-evaluatively.

The tasks were described in detail

At this point, control Ss were asked

to evaluate the sophomores attitudes toward the tasks.

The

experimental Ss were given the information that he had accepted
$1.00 ($20,00) to relate to a waiting S that the tasks were
enjoyable,

Ss then listened to a purported recording of the

conversation between the sophomore and the waiting S.

The

situation attempted to duplicate the condition actually
experienced by Festinger and Carlsmith's Ss.
All Ss were then required to rate the tasks as they
estimated the sophomore would have rated them.

Results indicated

support for Bern's self perception hypothesis since in both
studies the $1.00 condition produced significantly more
favourable ratings toward the tasks than did the $20,00
condition.

In neither study was the $20.00 condition significantly

different from the control condition.

Jones,

(1966) in a

replication of this study (the Bern interpersonal replication)
reports similar results.
Bern, (1965) reports a successful interpersonal replication
of the Cohen, (Brehm and Cohen, 1962) study in which under
graduates were offered varying amounts ($50.00, $1,00, $5.00,
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.

$10.00) to write an essay against their initial opinions on
an issue.

Cohen’s results essentially duplicate the Festinger-

Oarlsmith findings in that the higher the paid inducement the
less post-essay attitude rating coincided with the view advoc
ated in the essay.

Bern's, (1965) interpersonal replication

study employed 60 undergraduates placed in $.50, $1.00 and
control conditions.

Again Bern's observer S s when told the

behaviour of the participant 3 s and apparent controlling cir
cumstances made almost identical ratings of the participant
S' s post essay attitude rating.
Many other interpersonal replication tests of dissonance
phenomena have been reported by Bern, (1964, 19&5> 1966, 196?b,
196?c) and are supportive of his theory.
The interpersonal replication paradigm while offering the
most convincing support of the self-perception hypothesis is
not the only experimental strategy which has been used to test
Bern.

Bern reports several studies (e.g. 1964, 1966) which are

entirely "intrapersonal" in nature, yet designed to test his
theory.

Moreover, these studies add a further control to the

stimulus operations which have been interpreted as controlling
mand-tact discriminations in that the "manding" and "tacting"
stimuli are "raised from birth" in the laboratory.

One such

study will be described here along with an attempted inter
personal replication of it (V/oodyard, 1968).
Bern, (1966) in an experiment termed the "false confession"
study, predicted on the basis of the self-perception hypothesis
that more errors of recall v;ould occur after a S had made
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lower "false confessions" under conditions previously assoc
iated with telling the truth (tacting).

He also predicted

that stimuli previously associated with lying (manding) would
create self-disbelief in true confessions, thus produces more
errors in recall.

The tact and mand stimuli were lights to

which the S had been trained to respond truthfully (the tact
light) or falsely (the mand light).

As Bern, (1964) points out

with reference' to this procedure, "the answering of questions
has both mand and tact properties; we are using the terms tact
and mand respectively to indicate discriminative control or
absence thereof over the form of the response". Previous to the "stimulus raising" procedure S s were
required to participate in a word crossing-out task.

Meaning

(tell the truth or lie) was then given to the lights.

The E,

telling the S s that he was interested in hearing the quality
of their voices for a lie detection experiment, indicated to
the S whether he should respond into a microphone correctly
or incorrectly about his "crossing-out" behaviour.

The S was

told the two lights would continue to flash on in random order
as an indication of when to speak into the microphone.

After

each response the S indicated what he recalled as his actual
cross-out behaviour.
In accordance with Bern's prediction, more errors of re
call were made when "true" statements were uttered in the
presence of the "lie" light and when "false" statements were
uttered in the presence of the '"truth" light than in the other
conditions.

Moreover, the S's ratings of confidence in re

call were lower in the conditions with more recall errors.
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Thus, in Bern's terms previously learned discriminative cue
value of the lights influenced the confidence (self-credibility)
S-s had in their own judgement of recall.
Woodyard, (1968) noting that the false confession study
"was an experiment whose dependent variable was self-descriptive
statements", concluded an interpersonal simulation of the study
should produce the same judgements of recall.

Woodyard reas

oned on the basis of the self-perception hypothesis, in an
"interpersonal simulation" of Bern's experiment, 0-S s should
be able to make equivalent judgements of credibility on the
basis of the same mand-tact discriminations available to the
original participants.

Woodyard*s "interpersonal simulation"

was able to duplicate the "errors in recall" variable except
that there was no significant' difference in recall errors
comparing control to true confession lie light condition.

It

completely failed to duplicate the "confidence in recall" var
iable.

With additional analysis Woodyard demonstrated a demand

characteristics hypothesis (Orne, 1963) was a plausible alter
native explanation to the results of the false-confession
studies.
SOME CRITICISM OP B3H1S THEORY AITD RESEARCH
Recently Jones, Linder, Kiesler, Zanna and Brehm, (1968)
have criticized Bern's interpersonal replication experiments
and have proposed an alternative explanation of his results.
"Our alternative explanation of Bern's results
proposes that an artifact in his descriptions of
experimental conditions allowed a judgmental
process quite different from that postulated by
him. The descriptions used by Ben suggest that
a typical subject would be quite unwilling to
compiy with the experimenter's request in the
first place. However,•the hypothetical subject
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in the description does perform the requested
behaviour. Observers should therefore infer
that their subject was atypical and that he was
initially more willing to comply than most
subjects. Further, a subject who complied for
a small incentive would be seen as more atypical
than a subject who complied for a large incentive.
Our alternative explanation asserts that Bern's
observer-subjects were not behaving according to
his hypothesis of self-perception, but rather
that they merely judged differential hypothetical
subject self-selection."
Jones et.' al. performed a series of experiments to test
their hypothesis that Bern's observers were in effect "psychol
ogizing" about the initial attitudes of participant-subjects.
They were able to replicate Bern's results using his procedures.
However, when 0-S s were given information about involved S s
initial attitudes (their pretest scores), Bern's effect did not
hold.

Observers who were aware of pretest scores predicted a

positive relationship between incentives and attitude change.
Thus a significant controversy has developed over Bern's
analysis and supporting simulations which essentially centers
arotind the information that the 0-S should receive concerning
the original situation (Bern, 1967a, 1968; Elms, 1967; Jones,
Linder, Kiesler, Hanna and Brehm, 1968; Mills, 1967).

The

predominant criticism objects specifically to Bern's procedure
of not telling observer-subjects the original subject's pre
manipulation attitude.
Bern's Reply
Bern (Bern and McConnell, 1970) has suggested in reply to
much of the discussion concerning the salience of premanipulation attitudes, that much of the criticism has been based upon
a misunderstanding of his interpersonal simulation (replicat
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ion) methodology.

Using a computer-simulation analogy he

states that his self-perception theory asserts that an indiv
idual's attitude statements and the observer's judgements
about the individual's attitudes are "output statements" from
the same "internal program".

Testing this theory demands an

accurate assessment of the relevant "input statements" from
the situation being simulated.

Thus through "theoretically

guided assumptions" certain "input statements" must be elimin
ated as irrelevant to the model.

If both the observer and

participant subjects are using a self-selection rule in this
way;

"VJhat must my (this person's) attitude be if I am (he

is) willing to behave in this fashion in this situation" as
the self-perception theory implies, then Bern, (1970) maintains
that any conflicting initial attitude must be irrelevant for
both S's in arriving at their final "outcome stagement"
(attitude rating).

Bern makes a point of stressing that P-S s

are not forced to participate.

Therefore, the P-S concludes

that his postmanipulation attitude is, in fact, the same att
itude which motivated compliance in the first place.

In the

theory 0-5 s draw the same conclusion, "That must his real
attitude have been if he was willing to participate."

A Test of Bern's Contention about the ITon-Seiiance of
Premanipulation .Attitude
The following study by Bern 5 McConnell(1970) bears direct
relevance to the study that is the object of this paper
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cu,

and therefore it is described in some depth.
To empirically answer his critics (i.e. Jones, Linder
et al., 1963) Bern with IlcConnell (1970) designed a study to
assess the "salience of premanipulation attitude" in the forced
compliance procedure.
component experiments.

Their experimental design involved two
An attitude change experiment and an

attitude recall experiment.

Both experiments utilized the

forced-compliance paradigm in which subjects wrote counterattitudinal essays under varying conditions of freedom of
choice to write against their initial positions on a current
issue.

The attitude-change experiment is identical to the

usual forced-compliance experiment except for the Justification
manipulation and was included to insure replication of the
usual dissonance paradigm Bern's model seeks to explain.

The

attitude recall experiment was designed to directly examine
the "salience" of the initial attitudes for forced-compliance
S

Just after engaging in counterattitudinal behaviour.

The

"salience" of initial attitude is interpreted in terms of the
Ss error in recall of his initial attitude.

Thus, both

experiments are identical with the exception of outcome measure.
The outcome measure of the change experiment was attitude change
whereas the outcome measure of the recall-experiment was
attitude recall.
Ss in the experiment were 93 male undergraduate engineering
students.

The Ss received course credit points for their

participation.

Separate Ss were employed in the two experiments

to avoid the confounding effects of obtaining: the two outcome
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measures from the same Ss.

All Ss were run in group sessions.

In the first session an attitude questionnaire on various
campus issues was administered.

This questionnaire elicited

one issue on which 90% of the students held consensual opinions:
"How much control should students have over the kinds of courses
offered by the University?"

The attitude position responses

were obtained from a "6l-point horizontal scale labeled at
10-point intervals from ’No Control’ to ’Complete Control*",
In order to facilitate counterattitudinal essay productions
in the second session all Ss who fell below the midpoint of
the scale "Some-Control" were eliminated from further
consideration.
At the second session, one week later, experimental Ss
were randomly assigned to the two component experiments and
consequently to one of two "freedom of choice" conditions were
instructed in writing

that the psychology department was

continuing its research into campus attitudes and was
"collecting arguments for and against the various positions
expressed".

The No Choice condition S>s were simply requested

to write essays against student control of courses.

The Choice

condition Ss were instructed that they could argue either for
or against the student control of courses issue and that the
choice was up to them.

But, an addendum instruction was given

to Choice condition Ss in which it was explained that the
experimenters (Es) already had enough pro-student control
arguments and now required anti-control arguments.

The Es

then requested of the Choice condition Ss that "as many as
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possible" write anti-control essays.
The treatment conditions were the same in both component
experiments.

However, postmanipulation, the change experiment

Ss were asked to express their present attitude on the issue.
Recall experiment Ss were asked to recall their former expressed
position.

After collecting the main measures the experimental

Ss were asked 'for the other outcome measure.
61-point scales were used.

Again the same

All experimental Ss were asked to

indicate (on a similar scale) how much freedom of choice they
felt they had in terms of complying to the experimental
instructions.
Control condition Ss in both experiments were merely
asked to rate their current or recalled positions.

They did

not engage in any essay writing.
The results of their study are summarized in three tables
of Appendix E.

Table one shows the usual forced-compliance

results were obtained in the change experiment with Choice
condition Ss apparently demonstrating greater dissonance
effects than No Choice or Controls.

Table 1 also indicates

the perception of choice manipulation was successful.
presents comparable data for the recall experiment.

Table 2
Here the

results appear in effect to duplicate the results of the
change experiment in that £>s in the more dissonant condition
(Choice condition) make greater recall error than the No Choice
or Control conditions.

Table 3 presents inter-correlation

data on the measures for the recall experiment.

The data

indicates that high dissonance Ss show a significantly greater
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difference when comparing the correlation of recall versus
final (the second measure obtained) to recall versus initial
position.
Bern and McConnell,

(1970) interpret these results as

supportive of their position that premanipulation attitude
effects are non-salient to the forced-compliance procedure
since it appears that the higher the apparent dissonance the
greater is the forgetting effect.

Thus, writing counterattitudinal

essays, under conditions of freedom of choice to comply,
effectively "wipes out" initial attitude.

Moreover, they

suggest their results indicate that Ss actually perceive their
postmanipulation attitude to be identical to their premanipulation
attitude.
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Degree of "Importance" of Attitude Elements
And Dissonance Phenomena
The theoretical ramifications of the "importance" factor
(as specified by Festinger, 1957) of an attitude element and
its effects on dissonance phenomena have already been depicted
in connection with the discussion of cognitive dissonance
theory.

To reiterate, Festinger proposes that magnitude of

dissonance and consequent degree of dissonance reducing behav
iour varies directly as the importance, for the person, of the
elements in dissonant relation.

As Eiesler, (1968) points

out, what is precisely meant by importance is never really
made very clear in the theoretical expositions.

However,

importance seems to be (at least) a two-pronged variable.
On the one hand the concept can refer to the relative import
ance of an attitude element for the individual.

Thus, the

attitude, "I am against the war in Indo-China", may be far
more important to an involved soldier than to a housewife
whose only contact with the war is through the newspapers.
Secondly, importance can refer to the consensual importance
of the element itself.

Thus an attitude to the war in Indo-

China is, by consensus more important, than an attitude to
wards a particular brand of razor blades, for example.

This

discussion and the central focus of this study concerns itself
with the implications of the former (importance for the ind
ividual) definition.
The experimental literature concerned with manipulations
of (subjective) importance of attitude elements and the effect
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of varied importance on dissonance phenomena, has been largelyconfined to investigations based on "free-choice" and "exposure
to counterattitudinal information" paradigms.
Several studies have experimentally varied level of
importance within the context of the "free-choice" paradigm.
For example, Brehm, (1956); Cohen, Brehm and Latane,
Mills, Aronson and Robinson,

(1959);

(1959); Rosen, (1961); Cohen,

(1962) all produce evidence supportive of the predicted
differential effects of varied importance of cognitive elements.
"Free choice" paradigm experiments involve a choice
between attractive or potentially attractive alternatives
which differ along the dimension of attractiveness (importance
for the subject).

A "free-choice" experiment reported by

Deutsch, Krauss and Rosenau,

(1962) is specifically directed

toward the manipulation of importance through the manipulation
of the person's self-involvement.

In their experiment female

Ss rated six different kinds of jam on nine-point bipolar
rating scales in terms of overall taste and flavor.

After the

Ss had made their ratings, the E selected for each S a pair
of samples that on the first scale had received equivalent
ratingst at the centre of the scale.

The E then announced

that, "The company that's sponsoring the research would like
to give you a sample jar of either brand, whichever you want."
At this point a female experimenter was introduced as, "an
expert in the field of food selection factors", who v/as going
to conduct a panel interview in which she would "probe for
some of the reasons behind your food preferences".
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the Ss were given a high self-involvement manipulation, half
were given a low self-involvement manipulation.

The high

self-involvement condition made the choice relevant to valued
attributes of the self by stressing the relationship between
people's ability to judge subtle differences in the quality

;

of foods and their judgemental ability in other areas, such
as leadership aptitude, executive potential, and artistic
judgement.

The low self-involvement condition was given no

such self-esteem involving message.
select one or the other jam.
all six of the samples.

Ss were then asked to

After selection the Ss rerated

The data show that whether or not the

choice involves the self (is important to the self), is of
consequence.

In the high self-involvement conditions, the

chosen alternatives increase in value, and the unchosen
alternatives decrease in value more than in the low self
involvement condition,
v

Studies employing the "exposure to counterattitudinal
information" technique have produced data relevant to differential
importance of premanipulation attitude effects.

The "exposure"

paradigm utilizes a procedure wherein Ss are merely exposed to
persuasive counterattitudinal information.

Thus, Ss do not,

themselves, produce counterattitudinal behaviour but merely
receive it,

Cohen, (1962) has labelled, the results of such

procedures the "boomerang effect" in order to explain them in
terms of dissonance theory.

In the "exposure" situation

resultant dissonance can be reduced in a number of v/ays.

One

of these ways, and apparently the one most often utilized is
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for the S to bolster his original position and thus change
negatively in terms of the counterattitudinal information.
While this phenomena may he understood in terras of
dissonance theory, Festinger's theory was not specifically
designed with "boomerang effects" in mind.

In fact, it may

be argued that Festinger's actual position would countraindicate "boomerang effects" and that such results refute the
theory.
Recently Sherif, Sherif and Hebergall, (1965) in their
"social judgement-involvement approach" have dealt extensively
with the issue of relative "ego-involvement" and its effects
on attitude change produced by exposure to counterattitudinal
information.

Their formulation is designed to explain the

"boomerang effect".

Here the

'importance" variable of dis

sonance theory is equated with the "ego-involvement" variable.
Ego-involved attitudes are described by Sherif and
Cantril, (194-7) as "attitudes that have been learned, largely
as social values, that the individual identifies with himself;
and that have affective properties of varying degrees of int
ensity."

This view of ego-involvement has been retained by

Sherif in his more recent work in the area (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif and Hebergill, 1955).
Various investigators, operationally defining levels of
"involvement" 'in terras of initial attitude to an issue have
indicated that degree of initial attitude involvement effects
postnanipulation attitude change when Ss are exposed to
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counterattitudinal persuasion.

She effect has been that high

involved S s produce less change than low involved 3 s (e.g.
Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Hovland, Harvey and Sherif, 1957;
Cohen, 1962a).
On the other hand, Zimbardo (I960) experimentally manip
ulated involvement by telling 5 s that their attitude-judgement
about a juvenile delinquency case did or did not provide "a
good indication of their basic social values, their personal
ities and their outlook on life problems".

He found more

change occured in the direction of the counterattitudinal
position under high involvement after exposure to .attitude
discrepent information.

It is interesting to note that Zim

bardo formulates his hypothesis in terms of dissonance theory.
Cohen, (1962) producing the opposite results, also analyzes
his data in terms of their support for the dissonance position.
In summary, the available literature indicates that the
relative degree of importance of the attitude for the indiv
idual does effect the nature of attitude change that occurs
when dissonance is aroused.

When S s are exposed to inform

ation counter to their attitude, the usual finding (e.g. Cohen
1962) is that S's for whom the attitude-issue is highly imp
ortant seem to reduce dissonance (hypothetically) bj?- streng
thening their original attitude position "booming-effect",
although at least one investigator (Zimbardo, I960) found that
high importance 3 s weaken their original position after
exposure.
When individuals are placed in a "free-choice" between
alternatives situation and their initial attitudes to these
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alternatives are the same, experimentally induced high
importance of one alternative creates greater dissonance
(hypothetically) when the choice is made,

ihus, high imp

ortance 3s make greater attitude change with respect to the
chosen alternative (they evaluate it more favourably) than
Ss for whom the chosen alternative is not so important
(e.g. Deutsch, Krauss and Hosenau, 1962).

.

To the author's knowledge, no study has examined the
effect of the importance of the attitude-issue for the S
within the "forced-compliance" paradigm.

That is, no study

has manipulated degree of subjective importance of an att
itude and attempted to assess its effects on attitude change
after "forced-compliance" to counter-attitudinal behaviour
relevant to the given attitude element.
The present effort is an attempt to examine the possible
differential effects of the importance variable within the
context of a "forced-compliance" paradigm.
The Independent Variables of the Present Study
The two independent variables of the present study are
t

designed to reflect the subjective "importance" or "involve
ment" dimensions of an attitude-issue.

The two variables

"relevance of attitude" and "strength of commitment to attitude"
are di m en sio ns measured before any experimental manipulation

had an opportunity to effect the Ss attitude on the issue in
question (student control of courses at their school).

The

variables were measured through self-report on a Likert-type,
(1932) scale.
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.

Operational definitions of these two variables are perhaps
best presented in terns of the scale descriptions for the 5s.
Strength of Attitude Commitment
. . . we are interested here in how much your position
means to you. For instance, if you do not feel
committed at all to your position you will mark the
scale close to the "ho Commitment ?t all" position
on the scale. Individuals who are not committed
to a position are those who could easily be swayed
to another position. They are relatively openminded about the Issue while still holding an opinion.
■They would not likely participate in any form of
activity in support of their opinion. At the middle
range of the Strength of Commitment Scale would be
less easily swayed from their position. They would
be willing to support their position in an argument
or debate perhaps.
At the other end of the scale would be
individuals who feel strongly or "Completely"
committed to their position. 3uch individuals would
see themselves as being very staunch in their position
and not at all able to be swayed. They would be
willing to support their position quite actively and
if given the chance engage in a demonstration on its
behalf or openly campaign for it.
Attitude Relevance
. . . Here, we are interested in how often the issue
comes into your thoughts or conversation or how
often it touches your life — has implications for
your daily living. For instance, if this is a
constant concern you would mark, the scale toward
the high relevance end of the scale. If you never
think about It, mark the scale at the low relevance
end of the scale.
Since one requirement of the "forced-compliance" paradigm
is that all Ss take a counterattitudinal position, the present
study assumed that polarity of attitude position is not comp
letely related to polarity of subjective attitude importance.
Thus, Ss in the experiment while maintaining consensual position
on the Issue should be differentiable in terms of the independent
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variables.

.

Research by Ward, (1965, 1966) has indicated the

viability of such an assumption.

Ward, (1965) reports a study

in which involvement (subjective importance) was varied while
extremity of position was similar in all S s.

The.study shows

clearly that extremeness of stand and involvement in that
stand are not perfectly correlated.
Problem
The present study attempts to provide further data in
resolution:, of a crucial question involving both Bern's self
perception theory and his methodology employed to test this
theory, the interpersonal-simulation experiment.

The issue

is, whether or not the S's behaviour in a forced compliance
experiment (e.g. writing counterattitudinal essays) becomes
so very salient that it overwhelms his memory about his orig
inal position.

Bern's and his critic's positions on this issue

have already been discussed.

Bern's empirical answer to his

critics through his study with McConnell, (1970) has also been
described in some length.
This paper represents a partial replication of the Bern
and McConnell, (1970) experiments.

It employs similar pro

cedures to assess the salience of premanipulation attitude to
counterattitudinal behaviour and resultant attitude.
sense,

In a

it predicts the same outcome as Bern and McConnell's

work when results of the present experiment are analyzed with
undifferentiated group data.

This replication should produce

data which will indicate that counterattitudinal essay writing
engaged in freely, will induce a dissonance - type
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distortion in attitude recall of initial position which is
essentially similar to the attitude change phenomenon after
counterattitudinal behaviour.

However, generalizing from

cognitive dissonance theory assumptions, regarding forced
compliance, this project predicts differential recall and
change effects when subjects are partitioned into high and
low attitude “importance" groups in terms of the attitude to
be manipulated.
here,

Pestinger is quite clear on a point relevant

His theory predicts dissonance increases as “importance"

for the individual of conflicting attitude elements increases,
Moreover, amount of dissonance reducing behaviour increases
concomitantly as “importance" of the attitude increases.

Thus,

differential attitude change effects after the "forced-compliance
procudure should result when "importance" for the individual
of the attitude of focus in the essays is varied.

Moreover,

attitude recall of a previously expressed position should be
distorted differentially in terms of the "importance" variable.
It would be predicted then that high importance Ss would
exhibit more attitude change and greater recall error than
low importance Ss,
The study operationally defines "importance" in two ways.
Since Bern questions the salience of premanipulation attitude
one indicant of subjective importance which is especially
pertinent to the issue concerns the functional salience of an
attitude for the S in everyday life.

That is, how predominant

is the issue-attitude for the individual?
think about it, talk about it?

How often does he

How often is it relevant for
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This indicant of importance is termed "attitude rele

vance" .
The second indicant of importance which is varied in the
experiment is defined as the "s t r e n g t h of commitment11 the S
has to the premanipulation attitude.

Strength of commitment

as measured reflects the extent to which the S reports he
would support his position on an issue.
Briefly then, the problem of the present study focusses
upon the viability of Bern’s apparent claim that for all ind
ividuals and groups of individuals, initial attitudes are non
salient to counterattitudinal behaviour and attitudinal out
come of that behaviour.
Experimental Eyootheses
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Cognitive dissonance theory predicts differential disson
ance effects when the importance of the attitudinal elements
in dissonant relation are varied for S s.

Various experiments

particularly within the context of "free-choice" and "exposure
experimental paradigms has supported this prediction of disson
ance theory.

The following hypotheses are derivations from

dissonance theory.

In this case the predictions are related

to the "forced-compliance" paradigm.

Bern's self-perception

theory also predicts dissonance-type results after counter
attitudinal manipulations.

However, Bern's theory eschews any

reference to the characteristics of prernanipulation attitudes
of the S s in its explanation of dissonance phenomena.
According to Bern's theory, initial position and differences
in premanipulation importance of attitude elements is non-
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salient in the production of dissonance phenomenon.

.

Thus, if

the following hypothesis which predict differential effects
in terms of initial attitude importance (operationally def
ined in terms of premanipulation "attitude relevance" and
"strength of commitment" are supported, they will counterindicate derivations of Bern's theory.
Change Experiment
Hypothesis 1 .

Experimental subjects writing counterattitudinal

essays will demonstrate greater attitude change in the dir
ection of positions argued in the essays than Control Subjects.
(This prediction is supportive of both Bern and Eestinger's
positions).
Hypothesis 2 .

There will be a significant interaction effect

between attitude relevance level and the treatment conditions
with experimental high relevance subjects making greater post
treatment attitude change in the direction of positions argued
in the essays, than experimental low relevance subjects and
control subjects.
(If this prediction is supported it will tend to
counterindicate some implications of self-perception
theory and be supportive of cognitive dissonance theory).
Hypothesis 3 .

There will be a significant interaction effect

between attitude strength of commitment level and the treat
ment conditions with experimental high strength of commitment
subjects demonstrating greater postmanipulation attitude
change in the direction of positions argued in the essays,
than experimental low strength of commitment subjects and
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controls,
(If this prediction is supported the result will tend
to counterindicate some implications of self-perception
theory and be supportive of cognitive dissonance theory).
Attitude Recall Experiment
Cognitive dissonance theory does not make specific pred
ictions in terms of recall of a previously expressed position
after counterattitudinal behaviour,

however, a derivation

of the theory would suggest that postmanipulation recall meas
ure will demonstrate dissonance-type effects.

-Ss engaged

in counterattitudinal behaviour are in a stats of dissonance.
One way they can reduce this dissonance is to distort their
original attitude position.

‘
The distortion to be effective,

should take place In the direction of the counterattitudinal
behaviour.

Again, dissonance theory predicts results for the

recall measure after manipulation which are similar to the
change measure when importance of attitude is varied.

Thus,

recall error will vary as level of importance varies.

How

ever, similar to self-perception *s position on attitude change
after treatment, hem’s theory predicts no

differential effects

for the recall measure when differences in initial importance
of attitude are varied.
Hypothesis d .

Experimental subjects writing counterattitudinal

essays will demonstrate greater recall of initial attitude
error in the direction of positions argued in the essays, than
control subjects.
(This prediction is supportive of both bom's and
Eestinger1s positions).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36
Hypothesis 3 »

.

There will he a significant interaction effect

between attitude relevance level and the treatment conditions
with recall error as the dependent variable.

Experimental

high relevance subjects will make greater recall error in the
direction of positions argued in the essays than experimental
low relevance subjects.
(If this prediction is supported, results will tend
to countraindicate some implications of self-perception
theory and be supportive of dissonance theory).
Hypothesis 6 .

There will be a significant interaction effect

between attitude strength of commitment level and the treat
ment conditions with recall error as the dependent variable.
Experimental high strength of commitment subjects will make
greater recall error in the direction of positions argued in
the essays than experimental low relevance subjects.
(If this prediction is supported, the result will
tend to counterindicate some implications of self
perception theory and be supportive of cognitive
dissonance theory).
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects (Ss) were drawn from the twelfth grade of an
urban Roman Catholic all-male high school.

The original

subject pool of 179 males produced a sample of 136 who were
engaged in the actual experiments.

This number was further

reduced to 108 for final analysis due to a non-compliance
problem (to be discussed later in this chapter).

Except for

consideration in terms of the independent variable, degree of
attitude relevance (2 levels - high and low) Ss were apportioned
equally and randomly to the two component experiments and their
respective experimental conditions.
Experimental Conditions
For the sake of clarity further description of hhils study
will be broken down in terms of the two component experiments,
the Attitude Change Experiment and Attitude Recall Experiment,
Attitude Change Experiment
The main dependent variable here was attitude change from
premanipulation measurement to postmanipulation measurement
(one week interval).

The independent variables were degree

of "attitude relevance" and degree of "strength of commitment"
to attitude.

The Ss were separated into two levels of the

37
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independent measure in each case.

.

Before experimental man

ipulation the S s were separated on the "relevance" dimension
and assigned randomly to experimental and control conditions.
For data analysis, 3 s were reseparated on the other independ
ent variable strength of commitment.

The following two mat

rices show the four experimental conditions and the number S s
per condition.
with 3 s

Matrix (a) shows the experimental conditions

separated on the relevance dimension.

Matrix (b)

depicts the experimental conditions and their respective cell
frequencies when 3 s were separated postmanipulation on the
strength of commitment variable.
Change Experiment - Original Subject Pool
per Experimental'Condition
(a)

High Relevance

Experimental

Low Relevance

18

16

Control

18

16

(b)

High Strength
of Commitment

Low Strength
of Commitment

Experimental

10

10

13

19

Control

■

It should be remembered that the lower total subject
pool represented in matrix (b) is due to the abovementioned
non-compliance problem during experimental manipulation.
The treatment conditions, designated experimental and
control for the Change Experiment were designed to replicable
the forced compliance paradigm of cognitive dissonance phen
omena.

Experimental S s wrote counterattitudinal essays
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(expressing a position counterposed to the attitude issue in
question for the experiment).

They were given "freedom of

choice" as to the type of essay they wished to write, consist
ent with and replicating the "choice condition" of Bern and
McConnell’s (1970) study.1

Controls are treated in the same

way as experimentals with the exception that they write
counterattitudinal essays on an issue other than the issue of
focus for the -study.
Attitude hecall Ihcperiraent
In this case the main dependent variable was recall of
premanipulation attitude level (measured one week previous to
treatment, and the recall measure).

The data were analyzed

in terms of attitude recall error. . Again, the independent
variables were degree of "attitude relevance" and attitude
"strength of commitment".

The 5 s were separated and op-port

ioned in the same way as in the change experiment with rele
vance level the initial cell assignment criterion.

Strength

of commitment level separation was performed postmanipulation.
The S s who scored above the mean (36.3) on the strength of
commitment scale were assigned to the high group.

Those

scoring at or below the mean were assigned to the low group.
The following matrices are similar to the previous figures
regarding the attitude change experiment.

1.

Due to subject availability limitations, only the essential
conditions of the Bern and McConnell study were replicated
here. Thus, Bern and McConnell's bo Choice experimental
condition was not included in the two component experiments.
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Recall Experiment - Original Subject Pool
per Experimental Condition
(a)

High Relevance

now Relevance

Experimental

18

16

Control

18

16

GO

High Strength
of Commitment

Low Strength
of Commitment

Experimental

13

11

Control

17

11

Treatment conditions of the Recall Experiment are the
same as those of the Change Experiment.

Thus, experimental

S s write counterattitudinal essays relevant to the issue of
focus in the study.

Controls write "irrelevant" counter

attitudinal essays.

Materials
All of the scales employed to measure the three attitude
dimensions and perception of "freedom of choice" in experi
mental treatment conditions were similar to those used by Bern
and McConnell, (1970) in their study.

These were 61-point

horizontal scales labeled at 10-point intervals (see Appendix
A for all scales).

Procedure
In the first session class-size groups of approximately
30 students participated in viaat was termed "a survey of student
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attitudes”.

The questionnaire consisted of 10 issues selected

for their assumed pertinence to the particular population.
The purpose of the study was explained to the subjects through
the following instructions:
This survey is designed to determine student
attitudes at your high school on certain important
current issues. Although your participation in this
undertaking is entirely at your discretion, we
would greatly appreciate your co-operation in the
interests of much needed knowledge and understanding
of opinions within your student body. All information
will of course, be kept strictly confidential.
We only ask that you give us the following informations
date of birth, class and intended career plans.
This data will be collected to facilitate pertinent
correlations with the attitude information.
Spaces were provided for the identification data.

It

should be noted that before collection of the scored
questionnaires, the experimenter emphasized that subject
complete the identification data since he was to return in one
week and required some means without gathering names, of
identifying the students for the next session.

Moreover, each

subject was assigned a specific numbered card which the
experimenter requested he bring to the next session for
identification purposes.
The main instructions for the survey follow.

Note that

each scale is described carefully so that subjects had an
understanding of the dimensions on which they were to rate the,
issues.
INSTRUCTIONS
You will notice that each attitude-issue is typed at the
top of the page and followed by three scales? Attitude Position
Scale, Strength of Attitude Commitment Scale, and Attitude
Relevance Scale. The scales are similar In their structure
and you are simply required to mark each scale by drawing a
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line through the point on the scale that is most appropriate
for you.
EXAMPLEs
How hungry are you?
1

Not at
all

1 ...

Very
slightly

1

Somewhat

1

1 ./...... .1

Moderately Quite

Very

1

Extremely

Someone who feels just a little more than "Quite hungry" would
mark the example scale as shown.
DESCRIPTION OF SCALES

.

ATTITUDE POSITION SCALE
This scale requires that you report your position on the
issue at the top of the page. Mark the scale at the point
which most accurately indicates your opinion on the issue,
STRENGTH OF ATTITUDE COMMITMENT SCALE
The second scale requires you to indicate your perception
of how strong your attitude is on the issue. We are interested
here in how much your position on the issue means to you.
For instance, if you do not feel committed at all to your
position you will mark the scale close to the "No Commitment
at All" position on the scale.
Individuals who are not committed
to a position are those who could be easily swayed to another
position.
They are relatively openminded about the issue while
still holding an opinion. They would not likely participate
in any form of activity in support of their opinion.
At the middle range of the Strength of Attitude Commitment
Scale would be individuals who would be less easily swayed
from their position. They would be willing to support their
position in an argument or debate perhaps.
At the other end of the scale would be individuals who
feel strongly or "completely" committed to their position.
Such individuals would see themselves as being very staunch
in their position and not at all able to be swayed,
They
would be willing to support their position quite actively and
if given the chance engage in a demonstration on its behalf
or openly campaign for it,
ATTITUDE RELEVANCE SCALE
The third scale requires that you indicate how relevant
the particular issue is for you. Here, we are interested in
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how often the issue comes into your thoughts or conversation
or how often it touches your life - has implications for your
daily living. Bor instance, if this is a constant concern
you would mark the scale toward the high relevance end of the
scale. If you never think about it, mark the scale at the
low relevance end of the scale.
After the attitude survey was completed the experimenter
analyzed the attitude ratings of each issue.

The issue on

which there was most consensus of student attitude position
and greatest variation in terms of the independent variables
was selected for further use in the study:

"How much control

should students have over the kinds of courses offered at
their school?"

Ninety percent of the students at the first

session held positions above the midpoint of the attitude
position scale, "Some Control".

The forced-compliance paradigm

requires that all S s argue counterattitudinally in their
essays.

Therefore, the 10 percent (IS) who held positions

below the midpoint of the position scale were eliminated
from the experiment.
A further advantage of the use of the student control of
courses issue in the experimental manipulation was that Beni
and McConnell's (1970) work employed the same issue with their
undergraduate university student subjects.
The resultant K of 161 was now partitioned into two
levels of attitude relevance based upon scores of the rele
vance scales.

The initial division of 3 s was performed in

terns of the relevance dimension rather than the strength of
commitment independent variable since the former variable was
more normally distributed in terms of the population and was
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thus more readily divisible into high and low subgroups.

The

experimenter arbitrarily determined the limits of the high and
low relevance groups.

Subjects scoring ,:5 and below were

assigned to the low relevance group.

3 s scoring 35 and

above were established as the high relevance group.

Thus,

25 S s who fell about the midpoint on the relevance scale
were dropped from further consideration.

3 s divided into two

levels of attitude relevance were randomly assigned to one of
four treatment conditions in the component experiments.

Res

ultant cell frequencies are depicted in the matricies of the
previous section.
At the second session, one week later, S s were again
run in class-size groups of approximately 30 students.

As

they entered the testing room (a convenient classroom) each
student was asked to present his numbered identification card..
he received in the first session.

If he was one of the sub

jects selected to participate in the second session, he was
given a large (13" X 10") brown numerically identified manilla
envelope with the appropriate materials for his treatment cond
ition inside.

All treatment 8 s were requested to leave the

envelope sealed, seat themselves, and await further instruct
ions.

Students who were not selected for further participat

ion accompanied their teacher to the gymnasium.

This "role-

call" procedure consumed approximately four minutes of the
one hour alloted per group of students,

then the 3 s had all

been comfortably seated the 3 instructed them to open their
envelopes saying:
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Before you open your envelopes I would like to
give you some idea of their contents and some
instructions as to what you are to do with what
you find inside. Inside are three smaller (9" 12")
envelopes of different colours, one white, one
brown arid one light-green. When I tell you open
the large envelope and find the light-green one
inside. Open this light green one and read
carefully the instructions found inside.
Then
proceed to do as the instructions tell you.
Open only the light green envelope until you
receive further instructions from me. Are there
any questions? You have one half-hour to complete
this part of the experiment, You may now open
your envelopes.
The two treatment conditions found slightly different
instructions in their light-green envelopes,

Experimental Ss

found the following instructions:
The psychology department of the University of
Windsor is continuing its research into campus
issues and student opinions. It has been shown
that one of the best ways to get pertinent arguments
on both sides of an issue is to ask people to
write essays favouring only one side. This week
we are collecting such arguments for and against
the various positions expressed. Each participant
is being asked to write a short one page essay
on one of the issues and to take a specific position
in its regard. In your case you may write an essay
arguing that students should have complete control
over the kinds of courses offered at their school
or an essay which argues that they should have
little or no control, the choice is up to you.
Please write your essay on the attached sheet,
Consistent with Bern and McConnell's "choice condition"
an addendum sheet was inserted between the foregoing instructions
and the blank essay sheet.

This addendum instruction was

added with the purpose of insuring counterattitudinal
productions.

It read:
Please Note

We now find that we have enough "pro-control"
arguments and are in need of "anti-control" arguments.
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Therefore, in this session we would appreciate it
if as many of you as possible would write one
page essays which argue for the point of view
that "students should have VERY LITTLE or NO CONTROL
over the kinds of courses offered by their school.
Thank you.
Control treatment Ss were given exactly the same instructions
in the same way except that the issue of focus was changed to
a lowering of the drinking age issue.

Thus instructions varied

only in terms of the underlined sections of the above instructions
for the experimental treatment.

These sections were changed

for control treatment subjects to reads
,,, that the drinking age should be lowered to age
18 or that the drinking age should not be lowered
to age 18 but kept at the present 21.
addendum sheet,., that the drinking age should not be lowered to
age 18 but kept at the present 21,
All subjects completed their essays within $0 minutes.
When all had finished writing, the E requested that they place
their completed essays back in the large envelope.

Next, the

Ss were instructed to open the white envelopes and comply with
the instructions in it.

White envelopes contained instructions

which varied according to the component experiment to which
the subject had been assigned.

Attitude Change Experiment

subjects received the following instructions;
Please mark the following scale according to what
best represents your present feeling toward the
issue of; How much control should students have
over the kinds of courses offered at their school?
Attitude Recall Experiment subjects received these instructions
in their white envelopes;
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In the first session one week ago, we asked
your co-operation in a survey of student attit
udes. One of the issues in the questionnaire
concerned: How much control students should
have over the kinds of courses offered at their
school:'
Nov/, we want you to try and recall your feelings
expressed toward the student control issue in the
first session by marking the following scale in
the same place you did one week ago.
The scales used were the same as the attitude position scales
of one week earlier, with slight modifications for the Recall
Experiment.

These scales are presented in Appendix A.

When the S s had completed scoring the scales they were
instructed to place these sheets back in the white envelope
and place this envelope back in the large manilla envelope.
Next, 8 s were instructed to open the brown envelopes and
comply with the instructions in it.

Again the typed instruct

ions differed according to the component experiment each 8 had
been assigned.

Change Experiment 3 s received the same inst

ructions Recall Experiment S s had received in the white env
elope.

Thus, Change Experiment S s were now requested to

recall their initial attitude position.

On the other hand,

Recall Experiment S s were asked to rate their present attit
ude position.
In addition, all experimental condition S s received a
sheet with instructions and a scale designed to assess their
perception of how much freedom they had in choosing which'side
of the student-control issue to favour in the essay.

The inst

ructions for the "freedom of choice scale" (see Appendix A)
read:
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You have just written an essay taking a strong
position on the student control of courses issue.
Please indicate on the following scale how much
freedom of choice you feel that you had in
choosing which side of the issue to argue for in
your essay.
Experimental S s were also asked to indicate v/hether they
had perceived any change in their attitudinal position.
Finally, all S s were requested to return the remaining
materials to' the large envelope and all envelopes were col
lected.
In order to control for any qualitative differences of
the essays experimental S's wrote a "quality control" pro
cedure involving independent judges was included,

fhe judges

were four undergraduate university students and each was asked
to rate 11 essays (randomly assigned) in terras of their quality
of argument and strength of persuasion.

A five-point rating

scale ("poor" to "excellent") was used,

fhe results indicate

no significant differences between high and low importance
groups.

All groups averaged three or "good" on the scale.
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C h a p t e r 111.

Results
Preliminary Analyses
She first result of consequence to the study concerns
the outcome of the freedom of choice manipulation in the
expei*imental treatment conditions.

The expected outcome

based, on Bern and iMcConnell's (1970) results was a "minimal
non-compliance problem" due to this aspect of the experi
mental treatment.

The latter researchers report only two

(of 32) 3s were rendered inappropriate to analysis due to
their choosing to write pro-control rather than anticontrol
essays on the student control of courses issue.

This study,

employing a replication of Ben and McConnell’s procedure
found that 22 (of 66) Ss chose to write pro-attitudinal
essays.

This represents 33m of all Ss assigned to exper

imental treatment conditions.

The independent variable,

relevance of attitude on which Ss were initially separ
ated did not effect non-compliance frequency.

The fol

lowing matrices indicate original cell frequencies (the
bracketed figures) and resultant "n" per cell after the
non-compliance phenomenon.

i-9
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(a)

Change■Experiment - Resultant Cell Frequencies due to
ITon-Cornpliance__________________ _____________________
High Relevance

(b)

Low Relevance

Experimental

(18)

10

(16)

10

Control

(18)

15

(16)

15

Recall Experiment - Resultant Cell Frequencies due to
Non-Compliance__________ ______________________________
High Relevance

Low Relevance

Experimental

(18)

12

(16)

12

Control

(18)

15

(16)

15

Analysis of the perception of choice data from the
freedom of choice scale for S s who did comply, indicates
that the choice manipulation did allow experimental S s
to perceive freedom in terms of the kind of essay they
wished to write.

In the change experiment mean perceived

freedom of choice for experimental S s was 59.'+•
recall experiment the respective mean was 38.8.

In the
These mean

scores are well above the midpoint of the scale, "some
freedom of choice" and are actually higher than Bern and
McConnell's result (See tables 1 and 2 of Appendix B).

The

scores ranged from the minimum point, 1 to the maximum point,
60 on the scale.

This range was greater than that of Bern

and McConnell's 3 s.

They report all S's ranged between 20

and 30 on the freedom of choice scale.
Table 1 presents the intercorrelation analysis among
the three attitude dimensions.

These results indicate the

dimensions as measured are positively related to one another
and do not represent completely separate factors of the
attitude element.
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Table 1.

Intercorrelation Among Attitude Dimensions;
Attitude Relevance, Attitude Strength of
Commitment, and Initial Attitude Position by
Component Experiment

Experiment

Initial Position
X
Relevance

Initial position
X
Strength

Strength
TrA
Relevance

Change

+ .24*

+.61**

+ .66* *

Recall

+.56**

+.62**

+ .29*

p. <.05
**

p. <.01
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Product-moment correlations for the initial attitude
position dimension and the two dependent variables, attit
ude change and recall error (presented in table 2) suggest
the possible confounding effects of a covariant, initial
attitude position in the change experiment where attitude
change score is the dependent variable.

The table shows a

product-moment r of -.18 when correlating initial attitude
position and recall error score,
statistical significance.

This figure is far from

The correlation of -.38 between

attitude change score and initial position is statistically
significant at the .01 level,

t-tests between mean initial

position scores of the four conditions in each component
experiment indicates statistically significant differences
between the independent variable levels.

Differences in

initial attitude position between experimentals versus
controls were very slight and nonsignificant.
'The overall data comparing the treatment groups in
terms of initial attitude position suggests an analysis of .
covariance may be appropriate, at least as far as the
Attitude Change Experiment is concerned.
Bern and McConnell (1970) test their assumption that
the recall measure of their recall experiment is "phenomenologically identical" to the change measure of their change
experiment, in two ways,

hirst they invite the reader to

compare the figures of the two experiments (see tables 1
and 2 of Appendix B ) and suggest that "the attitude-recall
figures closely parallel the attitude-change results them1.

See Appendix I) for further discussion of this correl
ational result.
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Table 2.

Product-moment Correlations between Initial
Position and the Dependent Variables, Recall
Error and Attitude Change

Recall Error
Initial Position

-.18 (n.s.)

Attitude Change
'

-.38*

*p. <.01
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54.

selves and display the same kinds of differences among the
three conditions.

The figures are so similar to those in

the change experiment, that it would appear that we had
asked these S's (the recall subjects) for their current
attitudes rather than their initial attitudes."
Next, Bern and McConnell report "another way" of
testing their prediction of phenomenological identity
between the two outcorae measure.

In this second analysis

they report an intercorrelation comparison for the data
of the recall experiment.

The S s in their recall experi

ment were also asked to report their final attitudes after
they had attempted to recall their initial attitudes.

The

analysis consisted of comparing the correlation for re
call versus initial attitude, by the correlation for recall
vei'sus final attitude, in their three treatment conditions
(see table 3 of Appendix B fox* the reproduction of this
data).

Bern and McConnell suggest that this data supports

their predictions, since experimental S s, those engaged
in counterattitudinal behaviour, demonstrate a correlation
between their recall of their initial attitudes and their
final attitudes which is significantly higher than the
correlation between their recall and their actual initial
attitudes.

Moreover, they suggest that the very high

correlations between recall of initial attitudes and final
attitudes for the experimental S s (as compared to controls) is supportive of their hypothesis that the data
from the incoming counterattitudinal behaviour, "update the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

attitudinal information for the S and destroy any earlier
information to the contrary."
The validity of Bern and McConnell's conclusions reg
arding the foregoing analysis hinges on two factors.

In

the first place, a statistical comparison between two
correlations for correlated (not independent) samples
presents certain unavoidable difficulties arising from
underlying assumptions of the product-moment correlation
procedure.

Hays (1966) in fact, states that such a stat

istical procedure is rather meaningless.

An excerpt from

Hays (1966) in this regard is presented in Appendix B.
Ferguson (1966) outlines the statistical computations
necessary to obtain a comparison between correlations for
correlated samples, but qualifies his presentation by
stating that conclusions drawn from this procedure must be
interpreted with caution.
Moreover, the usefulness of the second outcome measure
of final attitude for the recall experiment 3 s may be
questioned.

Is this second measure simply an artifactual

outcome due to experimental demand for consistency between
the two measures, recall and final a t t i t u d e 3 e m and
McConnell propose that the data from their control group
wherein the correlation between recall and final attitude
is relatively low, "weakens" the possibility of an exper
imental demand effect.
In order to present comparative data the present
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study analyzed the data of the two component experiments
employing Ferguson (1966) procedure for comparing correl
ations between correlated samples.

Because of the

tenuous validity of this analytical procedure, and the
questionable nature of the second outcome measure, exper
imental hypotheses related to this analysis were not incl
uded.
The resultant data are presented in tables 3 and 4.
The tables indicate that regardless of whether 3 s are
separated on the independent variables, "strength of com
mitment" (table 3) or "attitude relevance" (table 4)
statistically significant differences are found between
the two correlation coeffecients for both experimental
treatment condition and control condition.

Moreover, the

correlation coefficients for recall versus final position
are very high for all conditions.

In fact they appeal*

slightly higher for control condition S s.

Apparently,

the assumption of the artifactual nature of the second
outcome measure, due to experimental- demand for consistency
between the two outcome measures is a viable possibility
in this study.
In this case, the conclusion must be that recall of
initial attitude and final attitude are "identical" but
this identity is likely due largely to the demand for con
sistency effect.
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Table 3.

Recall experiment: Product-moment Correlations
between Hecall of Initial Attitude Position and
Initial and Pinal Attitude Position with Strength
of Commitment

Recall
vs.
Initial
Position

Recall
vs.
Pinal
Position

Difference

Experimental High
Strength of Comm. (n=d.2 )

+ .20

+ .85

3.4-8**

Experimental Low
Strength of Comm. (n=12)

+ .71

+ .97

7.63**

Control High
Strength of Comm. (n=15)

+.64

+ .98

8.4-4-**

Control Low
Strength of Comm. (n=15)

+ .64-

+ .92

2.64-*

Condition

*

t

p. <.05

** p. <.01
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Table 4.

Recall Experiment: Product-moment Correlations
between Recall of Initial Attitude Position and
Initial and Pinal Position with Attitude Rele
vance the Independent Variable

Condition

Recall
Recall
vs.
vs.
Initial
Pinal
Position Position

t
Difference

Experimental High
Relevance

+ .37

+ .85

3.01**

Experimental Low
Relevance

+ .65

+ .89

2.26*

Control High
Relevance

+ .49

+ .97

6.64****

Control Low
Relevance

+ .72

+ .96

4.22***

*
**
***

p. <.10
p. <.05
p. <.01

****

D. <.001
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Major Analyses
A 2 X 2 analysis of covariance (initial attitude
position as the covariant), with cell frequencies adjusted
to obtain equal n s, was performed on the data for both comp
onent experiments.

Equal cell frequencies were obtained

by randomly dropping S s from cells in which the number
of cases exceeded the smallest n of the experiment.

In

order to minimize the possibilities of Type II error the
results of simple 2 2 2 analysis of variance are presented,
when they are pertinent.

This will minimize inappropriate

rejections of an experimental hypothesis due to the effects
of the covariant.

In this regard, it must be remembered

that the central purpose of the present study was to assess
the effects on dissonance-type phenomena . (recall of attitude
and change of attitude after counterattitudinal behaviour)
when certain properties of the attitude are varied.

Thus,

statistically significant difference between treatments
due to the combined effects of the covariant, initial att
itude position, and an independent variable manipulation
may be a viable result in terms of the studies' central
problem.
Again the data will be presented in terms of the comp
onent experiments.
Attitude Change Experiment
Two 2 1 2

(two treatment conditions: experimental and

control; and two levels of the independent variable attitude
relevance (high vs. low) or attitude strength of commitment
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high vs low) ) analysis of covariance were performed on
attitude change scores.

Change scores were calculated by

subtracting each Ss initial attitude from his final attit
ude.

Thus, negative quantities indicate that the Ss

became less favorable toward student control of curriculum,
the position argued by compliant Ss in the essays.
Relevance of Attitude
Mean attitude change scores (both before and after
adjustment with the covariant, initial position of attit
ude) with level of attitude relevance varied in experi
mental and control treatment conditions are presented in
table 5.

A summary of the analysis of covariance is pres

ented in table 6.

(A summary of comparable analysis of

variance is presented in Appendix D.)
'J?he analysis of covariance shows the only significant
source of variance is an overall significant main effect
(p. <.001) with respect to experimental treatment (Exper
imental versus Control Conditions),

ihe preceding analysis

of covariance provides evidence regarding the viability of
two of the experimental hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1

Experimental subjects will show sign

ificantly greater attitude change in the direction of
positions argued in the essays than control subjects.
.Hypothesis 2

there will be a significant interaction

effect between attitude relevance level and the treatment
conditions with.experimental high relevance Ss mating sign
ificantly greater attitude change than experimental low
relevance Ss.
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Table 5.

Change Experiment: Mean Adjusted a and Unadjusted
Attitude Change Score in each Condition with
Attitude Relevance the Independent Variable

Low :Relevance

High Relevance

Experimental

-7.1 (-7.95)a

-16.5 (-15.26)8

Control

+1.3 (-0.07)a

+ 1.3 (+2.28)a

a Means are adjusted for the covariate, initial attitude
position.
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Table 6 .

Change Experiment: Summary of Analysis of
Covariance with Attitude Relevance the Independent
Variable

Source

df

MS

F

E

A (Treatment)

1

1250.99

9.58

B (Relevance)

1

58.96

.45

K.S.

AB (Interaction)

1

233.27

1.79

N.3.

35 •

130.56

Error

<.01

aRaw scores are transformed by adding a constant (K --I-3 3 )
in order to eliminate use of negative integers of change
scores.
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Hypothesis .1-, is supported.

It is evident that S s

in the experimental condition who wrote counterattitudinal
essays made significantly greater attitude change in the
direction of the position argued in the essays, than did
Control 8 s who did not write counterattitudinal essays on
the issue in question.

Ibis result indicates the experi

ment successfully produced the attitude shift expected
through cognitive dissonance theory.
Hypothesis 2 did not receive support.

Thus level of

attitude relevance did not differentiate S s on the depend
ent variable, attitude change.

However table 6 indicates

the difference tended in the predicted- direction.
At ti t u d e St re ngt h of C omm itment

Mean covariance adjusted and unadjusted change scores
with level of attitude strength of commitment varied in
experimental and control treatment conditions are present
ed in table 7.

A summary of the analysis of covariance

and comparable analysis of variance is presented in tables
8a and 8b.

The analysis of covariance indicates one sign

ificant source of variance.

'There is an overall signific

ant main effect (p. <.001) with respect to experimental
treatment.

The analysis related to two of the experi

mental hypotheses.
Hypothesis

j.»

Txperimental subjects will show sign

ificantly greater attitude change in the direction of pos
itions argued in the essays than control subjects. .
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Table 7-

Change Experiment:
Kean Adjusted and Unadjusted
Attitude Change Score in each Condition with
Strength of Commitment the Independent Variable

Low Strength
of Comm.

High Strength
of Comm.

Experimental

-5.3 (~6.92)a

-18.3 (-16.00)’

Control

+3.7 (+2.l7)a

+ 1.00 (+1.85)’

Means are adjusted for the covariate, Initial Attitude
Position.
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Table 8a.

Change Experiment: Summary of Analysis of
Covariance with Strength of Commitment the
Independent Variable3

Source
A (Treatments)

df

MS

3?

P
<.001

1

1795.23

13.80

B (Strength of Comm.)

1

177.82

1.37

?.T

AB (Interaction)

1

186.10

1.4-3

I'i• 3 •

35

130.13

Error

'•

ci

Haw scores are transformed by adding a constant (k=+33)
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O

I 'i • O *

Table 8b.

Change Experiment:
Summary of Analysis of
Variance with Strength of Commitment the
Independent Variable.

Source

: 'O
iuO

df

F

P

A (Treatments)

1

2002.23

14.52

<.001

B (Strength of Comm.)

1

616.23

4.4?

<.05

AB (Interaction)

1

265.23

1.92

Error

36

'

137.90

aRaw scores transformed Id*/1 aclaing a constant (i:=+33)
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U.S.

67.

Hypotheses 3*

There will be a significant inter-,

action effect between strength of commitment level and
the treatment conditions with high strength of commitment
subjects demonstrating greater attitude change than low
strength of commitment subjects.
The results in covariance analysis of strength of
commitment data are similar to those when attitude rele
vance is varied confirming hypothesis 1 and provide the
same evidence of significant dissonance effects.

The pred

icted interaction effects are non-significant, discontinu
ing’hypothesis 3.

Again the data in terms of interaction

effect tended in the predicted direction.
Moreover, the analysis of variance design which incl
udes variance due to the initial position of attitude
dimension, indicates a significant main effect (p. <. 05)
on the strength of commitment variable.

Two F tests

(v.'iner, 1962) were used to analyze the simple effects.

The

results indicate that experimental high strength of commit
ment S's differed significantly (I[=6.13; df-1.36; p. <.01)
in attitude change due to the experimental treatment,

non

significant differences were found when the respective cont
rol groups were compared.

This suggests that although the

strength of commitment variable itself does not produce dif
ferences in amount of attitude change due to counterattitudinal
behaviour, its combined effects with initial attitude pos
ition, result in significant variance.

A look at the treat

ment means of the respective conditions (table 7) indicates
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what these differences reflect.

The high strength of com

mitment experimental group shifts significantly more
(x=~16.5) than the low strength experimental group
(x~-7.1).

Apparently, the strength of commitment dimen

sion as measured by itself is not sensitive enough to effect
I
differences. Hypothesis 3 in its stated form must be rej
ected.

However, acceptance of the null hypothesis with all

of its ramifications seems inappropriate.

Further disc

ussion of this issue should be reserved for the following
Chapter.
Attitude Recall experiment
Two 2 x 2

analysis of covariance were performed on

attitude recall error scores.

Recall error scores were

computed by subtracting subject's initial attitude position
from his postmanipulation recall of that original position.
Thus, negative scores indicate error in the direction of
the position expressed in the essays.
Relevance of Attitude'
Mean covariance adjusted and unadjusted recall error
scores are depicted in table 9.

Table 10 summarizes the

analysis of covariance.
The analysis of covariance results indicate all three
variance scores are significant.

Thus, a significant main

A effect (experimental versus control), main B effect (high
relevance versus low relevance) and AB interaction effect
are noted.
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Table 9.

Hecall Experiment:
Mean Adjusted8 and Unadjusted
Attitude Hecall Error in each Condition with
Attitude Helevance the Independent Variable.

Low Relevance

High Relevance

Experimental

-8.33 (-9.4-0)a

-0.6? (+0.32)a

Control

+1.0

-0.58 (+0.62)a

(-0.13)a

aMeans are adjusted for the covariate, Initial Attitude
Position
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Table 10.

Recall Experiment:
Summary of Analysis of
Covariance With Attitude Relevance the Indep
endent Variable.

Source

df

KS

•p

F:

A (Treatments)

1

274.44

■5.19

<.05

B (Relevance)

1

270.55

5.12

<•05

AB (Interaction)

1"

241.81

4.58

<.05

Error

43

52.84

aRaw Scores are transformed by adding a constant (IL=+22)
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Six P tests were computed to test simple effects
among the adjusted cell means.

The results indicate that

low relevance of attitude 3 s who write counterattitudinal
essays make significantly more recall of attitude error
than high, relevance S s who write similar essays (P =10.63
df = 1.4-3; p<.01).

High relevance control S s did not

make significantly greater recall error than low relevance
controls.

Thus, the difference between means of the exper

imental conditions accounts for the significant main B
effect of analysis of covariance.

Comparison between

adjusted treatment means within the low relevance group
indicated statistically significant differences between
experimental and control low relevance S s (P = 9.68; df ■=
1.4-3; p<^.01).

Comparison between adjusted means of the

low relevance experimentals and high relevance controls
was also significant (P = 11.29; df = 1.4-3; p<.01).
Nonsignificant differences were found between experimental
high relevance and control high relevance and control low
relevance S s.
The foregoing analyses effect the tenability of two
of the experimental hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4-.

Experimental subjects v/ill show sign

ificantly greater recall of initial attitude error in the
direction of the position argued in the essays than cont
rol subjects.
Hypothesis .p.

There will be a significant inter-
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action effect between attitude relevance level and the
treatment conditions with recall error as the dependent
variable..

Experimental high relevance subjects will make

significantly greater recall error in the direction of the
position argued in the essays than experimental low rele
vance subjects.
Hypothesis 4
significance.

received support at the .01 level of

Hypothesis 5 w&s n °t supported as stated.

However, results do indicate a significant interaction
(p. <.01) effect between the treatment conditions and
levels of attitude relevance.

The nature of this inter

action T
was in a direction exactly opposite to the stated
prediction.

Thus experimental low relevance _S s make

significantly greater recall error after manipulation
than high relevance S s.

Moreover, concerning hypothesis

5, the data indicate that high relevance experimentals do
not differ in amount of recall error from either control
group.

Therefore, the differences relevant to hypothesis

4a 'which predicted a main A effect are due largely to the
diffei’ences between the low relevance experimental 3 s
and control 3 s .
Attitude Strength of Commitment
Adjusted and nonadjusted mean scores for the recall
experiment with strength of attitude commitment are pres
ented in table 11.

The analysis of covariance is summar

ized in table 12.
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(Table 11.

Recall Experiment: Kean Adjusted and Unadjusted
Attitude Recall Error in each Condition with
Strength of Commitment the Independent Variable.

Low Strength
of Commitment

. High Strength
of Commitment

Experimental

-7.45 (-7.?6)a

-1.09 (-0.76)a

Control

+5.9

+0.09 (+0.52)a

(+5.46)a

aKeans are adjusted for the covariate, Initial Attitude
Position.
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fable 12.

Hecall Experiment: Summary of Analysis of
Covariance with Strength of Commitment the
Independent Variable .

Source

df

p

MS

A (Treatments)

1

4-29.04-

8.99

.01

B (C ommit m ent)

1

23.66

.50

!'•«•S *

AB (Interaction)

1.

268.38

5.63

.05

Error

39

4-7.68

aRaw scores transformed by adding a constant (K-+22).
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The covariance analysis indicates statistically sign
ificant main A effect (experimental vs. control) and an
AB interaction effect.
A simple effects analysis of the adjusted cells means
employing 6 F tests was computed.

These results indicate

that low strength of commitment experimental S s engaging
in counterat.titudinai essay writing make greater post
manipulation recall of initial attitude errors than high
strength of commitment experimental 3 s writing similar
essays (F = 5*58; df 1.39; P <<>05).

I-ow strength of com

mitment experimentals make greater recall error than low
strength of commitment controls (F =• Id.33; df = 1.39;
p <.01) and high strength of -commitment controls (F - 7.80;
df = 1.39; P <.01).

The high strength experimental group

does not differ significantly in amount of recall error
from either control group.
These analyses rjrovide evidence pertinent to two of
the experimental hypotheses.
Hypothesis d ..

Experimental subjects will show

greater error in recall of initial attitude in the direction
of the positions argued in the essays than control subjects.
Hypothesis 6.

There will be a significant inter

action effect between level of strength of commitment and
the treatment conditions with recall error as the depend
ent variable.

Experimental high strength of commitment

subjects will make significantly greater recall of attitude
error than experimental low relevance subjects.
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Hypothesis 4 received support at the .01 level of
statistical significance.
as stated.

Hypothesis 6 was not supported

Similar to the results of the recall experiment

when relevance is the independent variable a significant
(p. ^. 05) interaction effect was noted for the strength
of commitment analysis, but the nature of the interaction
was in the direction opposite to the predictions,

ihus,

experimental low strength Ss made significantly greater
recall of initial attitude error than high strength Ss.
Again, with regards to hypothesis 4 the predicted
main effect is due largely to the differences between exp
erimental low strength of commitment Ss and the control
conditions since high strength of commitment Ss behave
similarly to the controls in terms of recall error.
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Chapter IV
Discussion
The major objective of the study involved a partial
replication of Bern and McConnell's (1970) procedure des
igned to assess, the "salience" of premanipulation, attitude
to attitude ratings after the experimental manipulation of
writing counterattitudinal essays.

Thus the major question

to be asked is: "does initial attitude effect outcome
attitude after manipulation,in any way?"

The answer to

this question has great relevance to the viability of
Bern's self-perception theory of attitude phenomena and
the concomitant means of testing his theory by means of
the "interpersonal simulation" technique.

These issues

have been discussed adequately in Chapter I.
Briefly to recount the results' of Bern and McConnell's
(1970) work, they found that 8 s in a typical forced
compliance experiment are not able to recall their pre
manipulation attitudes correctly.

Moreover, they actually

perceive their postmanipulation attitudes to be Identical
to their premanipulation attitudes.

Beni 1 McConnell infer

from these results confirmation of the self-perception
hypothesis that the participant's observation of himself
-

77

_
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engaging voluntarily in counterattitudinal behaviour has
so strong an effect on him as to virtually "wipe out" the
effects of any relevant premanipulation attitude elements.
Thus the participant makes the sane inferences as an indep
endent observer regarding what his attitude must be after
the manipulation.

Their conclusion was that premanipul

ation attitude is "non-salient" for the participant S s
and thus irrelevant information for the observer-.

S s of

an interpersonal simulation of a forced compliance experi
ment.
The present study suggests that if 3 s are partitioned
into levels of "attitude relevance" and/or attitude "strength
of commitment" interaction effects between these two indep
endent variables and attitude recall error and attitude
change (as dependent variables) will occur.

The results

of the study support this general prediction although the
specific predictions as to the nature of this interaction
were only supported in the Change Experiment,

An inter

action effect exactly reverse to the experimental pred
iction was observed in the Recall Experiment.

However,

before discussing these issues some mention should be made
of the results of the freedom of choice manipulation.
As noted, Sera's (1970) "choice condition” (which was
exactly replicated within the present experimental treat
ments) produced only 2 (of 32) nonconpliant _S s.

The

present studies experimental treatment resulted in 22 (of
66) noncompliant 3 s .

Clearly differences exist between
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the 3 populations of the respective studies.

These diff

erences may be discussed in terms of the: • relative cog
nitive predispositions of the 3 s to the experiment.

In

the first place, Bern's university student subjects were
given course credit for participation in his experiment.
Subjects of this experimenter were given no such post
manipulation reward.

Such incentives may have induced

more complete compliance to the apparent wishes of the
experimenter as presented in the "addendum sheet" for Bern'
S s.

Perhaps a more complete explanation of the radically

different compliance results may be phrased in terms of
certain social-personality aspects of the respective pop
ulations.

Bern's S's as male undergraduate engineering

students are undoubtedly rather homogeneous group in terms
of such factors as intelligence, motivation, and social
conformity.

Moreover, the "political” awareness In terms

of campus issues (of which the student-control issue is
one) of students in the applied sciences is perhaps lower
than general arts students.

This is not to say that these

students are not aware and involved with certain signif
icant issues.

For instance, government contract allotment

cut backs as an Issue, would probably induce a good deal
of involvement for engineering students.

Hov/ever, one

might -postulate (admittedly on tenuous empirical grounds)
that Bern's choice of 3 pool and his choice of issue was
ideal to gain compliance and produce the "non-salience"
of initial attitude results.

On the other hand, a group

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of liigh school students may be said to be more heterogeneous
in terms of the various factors mentioned above.

The range

of scored responses on the freedom of choice scale of the
S s in this study (1 to 60 as compared to Bern's S's 20-30)
can be said to bear out this contention.

Moreover, and per

haps of great consequence to this discussion, the high
school from which these 3 s were drawn had only recently
begun a transition from school administrative control of
courses to student choice and control of their courses.

The

experimenter only learned this after the study had been con
ducted.

Thus, the issue of focus in the forced compliance

paradigm was relevant, in a real sense, for the 3 s in the
present study.

As a consequence, it might be assumed that

some S s on all levels of the independent variables (non
significant differences in this connection) chose to argue
the position they favoured lest they be lured by a perceived
"teacher-type" into arguing against their interests.
Considering the high degree of noncompliance and the
high mean "freedom of choice" scores for the present study,
it may be concluded that the choice manipulation for exper
imental treatment S s was successful.

S s in the present

study demonstrated much greater non-compliance and greater
mean "freedom of choice" scores than Ben and McConnell's
population.

'Apparently, inherent differences between Bern

and McConnell's S s and the S s of this study, caused dif
ferences in willingness to comply with regard to the type
of essay to write, with the present 3 population being less
willing to comply.
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With regard to the three dimensions of attitude;
relevance, strength of commitment and position, as measured
by the 61-point horizontal scales, they do not represent
distinct factors of the attitude element as the inter
correlation matrix presented in table 1 seems to suggest.
They may in fact, in their combined effects represent a
more generalized, factor of attitude that might be termed
its "functional importance" for the subject.

"Importance"

here would be defined in terms of Festinger's meaning of
the term when he uses it in connection with his cognitive
dissonance theory.

However, the relatively high degree

of interrelationship between the dimensions must not obscure
the more important fact that both relevance and strength
of commitment as measured, were sensitive enough to sign
ificantly differentiate S's in the crucial covariance
analyses of the recall experiment.
Further to this issue of relation between the dimen
sions, it might be suggested that a positional response
bias was operant to some extent since the scales were
identical in their structure and the nature of their pol
arity.

Again, this does not obscure the results of the

major analysis of the experiment since such a response
bias would have been operant for all 3 s in the same way.
However, future research efforts may choose to vary the
means of defining the dimensions.

For example, the strength

of commitment could be defined empirically as to extent of
actual political activism, with respect to an Issue.
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Now, with regard to the central problem and predict
ions of the present study.

All of the experimental hypo

theses were direct generalizations fro.a implications of
cognitive dissonance theory,

I'hat is, in the change exp-

eriment it was predicted that Ss engaging in counterattitudinal behaviour (writing essays) would demonstrate attitudinal shift of their positions when compared with control
subjects who ‘
did not write relevant counterattitude essays,
(hypothesis l).

Hypotheses 2 and 3 follow directly from

theory and evidence that greater attitudinal shift will
occur when the attitudinal element is of greater "importance'
to the individual,

i'he variables relevance of attitude

(how often the S thinks about or is involved with the
attitude issue as reported by him) and strength of com
mitment (the extent to which the individual would support
his position as reported bg him) were seen as indicants
of the importance factor.

Thus, high relevance (strength

of commitment) Ss should show greater attitude change
than low relevance (strength of commitment) Ss.

Hypotheses

1 and 4 received support indicating that the expected
results of the forced compliance paradigm were produced,
in the study.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 did not receive support

although the differences were definitely in the predicted
direction,

koreover, a simple analysis of variance

(thus including variance due to the covariant, initial
position) computed on the data with strength of commitment
as the independent variable produced a signif-
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O

icant main effect.

-J,

This was a main effect due to comparison

of the levels of strength'of commitment.

All high strength

8 s were significantly different from all low strength 3 s.
Simple effects analysis indicate this significant main
effect was due to a significant difference in amount of
attitude change between the two experimental conditions.
Thus, high strength of commitment experimental S s made
significantly greater attitude change than low strength of
commitment experimental S s when variance due to initial
attitude position is included in the statistical comp
arisons of unadjusted means.

(An analysis of variance on

the data for the change experiment with attitude relevance
as the independent variable did not produce simple effects
results similar to those described above).
The results of the simple 2 x 2

analysis of variance

was included since its implications da tend to counterindicate an implication of self-perception theory.

According

to Bern's position (1955, 1970), "private" cognitive differen
ces (such as subjective differences in attitude relevance,
strength of commitment and initial position) between S s
before they engage in behaviour which is counter to their att
itude, should not differentiate S s, in terms of the amount
of change that takes place after countersttitudinal behaviour.
In Beia's terms such private or internal differences are
"non-salient" to the behaviour.

Attitudinal change on an

issue should be due solely to external behavioural var
iables.

In this case, since all experimental 3 s engaged
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in the sane behaviour (the essay quality analysis by
independent judges, as reported in the methods section
would indicate they did) the results should not be infl
uenced by premanipulation characteristics of the attitude
if Ben's assumptions are correct.
However, experimental hypotheses 2 and 3 cue phrased
in terms of the importance variables as operationally
defined in the study.

As such, they are not supported.

Thus, attitude relevance and strength of commitment do not
differentiate 3s in terms of attitude change, after counterattitudinal behaviour, at statistically significant levels
'although the differences are in the predicted direction.
'the data from the recall experiment offers some very
interesting implications for discussion.

Again, there

were significant differences between nondifferentiated
experimental treatment Os and controls on the dependent
variable (here, recall of initial attitude error).
Hypothesis 4 predicted this difference and both self'perception and cognitive dissonance theory anticipate this
result although the respective theories would explain it
in different v;ays as has been discussed previously.

Cog

nitive dissonance theory explains that engaging in counterattitudinal b e h a v i o u r (i.e. vrx’iting count or at t itudinal

essays) induces a psychologically unconfortable state
within the individual termed dissonance,

fne presence of

dissonance encourages dissonance reducing behaviour.
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In

one's recall of a previously expressed position on the
issue in the direction of the position taken in the essay.
On the other hand, self-perception theory explains that
the individual produces the dissonance phenomena by
observing his counterattitudinal behaviour and the cont
rolling circumstances of that behaviour, much as an indep
endent observer wfould.

The behaviourally involved S then

makes decisions about the status of his attitude based
solely on the relevant behaviour and its controlling cir
cumstances.

Thus, an error in recall would be interpreted

through the self-perception hypothesis as error based
solely on the effects of self-perceived behavioural obser
vations without any recourse to internal cognitive circum
stances of the S.

The crucial question of this study is

which theory explains the data most adequately.
Hypotheses 4- and 5 phrased in terms of cognitive dis
sonance theory reflect this question and the data relevant
to these respective predictions provide critical evidence
regarding the question.
Hypotheses 4- and 5 as stated are not supported.

How

ever, a statistically significant interaction between
levels of the importance variables, attitude relevance and
strength of commitment, and the treatment conditions
(experimental versus control) is evident.

The prediction

that experimental treatment 3 s with high scores on imp
ortance variables would make significantly greater amount
of recall error than the low level S s, was derived from
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Bestinger1s (1957) original theoretical premises.

She

present data indicates an interaction effect directly
opposite to the derived prediction.

Thus, experimental

S s with low scores on the importance variables make sign
ificantly greater recall error than high importance level
S s and controls.

This result does not support the derivatio

of cognitive dissonance theory presented in hypotheses 5 and
6, nor does it support self-perception theory which would
predict no differences in recall error between the high
and low importonce groups.
Bern and McConnell (1970) employed the recall of
initial attitude measure as an indicant of the "salience"
of prenanipulation attitude.. In their terms, if preman
ipulation attitude was salient 3 s would be able to rem
ember their previously expressed position on the relevant
issue after they had engaged In counterattitudinal behav
iour.

Their 8 s who wrote counterattitudinal essays in

the "choice condition" (here the experimental treatment)
could not correctly recall their initial position when
compared to control S s,

who did not write essays.

They

interpret this data as an indication that premanipulat ion
attitude is effectively "wiped out" as an influence in
postrnanipulation measurements of new position on the issue.
It is "wiped out" by the very salient effects of writing
counterattitudinal essays.
Bern a McConnell also suggest that recalling one's
previously expressed position after manipulation is
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87.

"phenomenologically identical'1 to expressing a new pos
ition.

Both measures are effected in the sane way by

observing counterattitudinal behaviour.
The present data seems to call into question their
assumptions.

The low importance experimental groups

(low relevance and low strength of commitment) seem to
behave as Bern and McConnell's (1970) choice treatment cond
ition S s did.

That is, they forgot their initial attit

ude after counterattitudinal behaviour and made recall
distortions in the direction of positions argued in the
essays.

However, the high importance experimental groups

in the present recall experiment did not forget ’their orig
inal positions when compared to low importance groups and
controls.
The implication is that when an attitude is important
to a person he will not forget what his position was on
the issue even after engaging in counterattitudinal beh
aviour.

In other words, premanipulation attitude is

"salient''' when high Importance 3 s are engaging in counter
attitudinal behaviour in that they are apparently aware of it,
Moreover, for high importance 3 s the recall measure and
the new position (change) measure are not "phenomenologically
identical" in that they are apparently effected by counter
attitudinal manipulation in different ways as evidenced by
the data for high importance experimental S s in the change
experiment in which high importance 3 s did tend to prod
uce greater change than low importance experimental 3 s.
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88.

A comparison drawn between the data of the two comp
onent experiments helps to explain the salience of prenianipulation attitude issue in the context of the usual forcedcompliance experiment where change of attitude (rather than
recall of initial position) is the outcome variable.
Apparently S s for whom the issue is an important one
(it is quite relevant for them and they express strong
commitment to it) are aware of their premanipulation pos
ition throughout the forced compliance experiment.

In

other words, their attitude is salient to the experiment
throughout,

moreover, because it is salient to them this

salience may be said to induce greater dissonance and con
comitantly greater (but nonsignificantly greater in this
experiment)amounts of attitude change when they are compared
to controls and low importance experimental in a "forced
compliance" (change) experiment.

On the other hand, low

importance S 's are not particularly concerned about their
original position.

It is less salient for them and engaging

in counterattitudinal behaviour is a strong enough influence
to cause them to forget their original position and produce
attitude change effects.

Because original attitude is less

salient for them, dissonance is less severe and attitude
changes less than the high importance experimentals for
whom original attitude is quite salient.
If these contentions are viable, Bern's self-perception
hypothesis and his interpersonal-simulation technique for
testing his theory are challenged to some extent by the
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op.

results of the present experiments.

Self--perception theory

is capable of explaining the data of the low importance
groups in both component experiments.

However, Bern's premise

that internal cognitive components are not salient to the
forced-corapliance paradigm for all 3 s is not supported by
the results of these experiments.

Apparently, for certain

individuals for v/horn a given issue is highly relevant and
to which they' are strongly committed internal variables
(such as prenanipulation attitude position) do play a
certain role in determining self-perceived attitude judge
ments.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

SUMMARY
The purpose of this study was to provide further evidence
relevant to a controversy that has arisen over a major postulate
of Bern's self-perception theory and the "interpersonal
simulations" used by Bern to test his theory.

Briefly, Bern's

theory, designed as an alternative explanation of cognitive
dissonance phenomena, states that people make judgements about
their own behaviour in the same manner as they make judgements
about another’s behaviour.

In a "forced-compliance" paradigm

experiment where Ss are made to engage in counterattitudinal
behaviour, Bern's theory explains the usual dissonance effects
(as indicated by postmanipulation attitude change) as due to
the Ss observation of his behaviour and its controlling
conditions within the experiment.

The theory holds that these

behavioural observations and subsequent judgements made on the
basis of them, are phenomenologically the same processes that
occur if an independent person were to observe the Ss behaviour
and make subsequent judgements as to its implications.

The

"interpersonal simulation" technique was designed by Bern to
test his theory.

In an "interpersonal simulation", independent

"observer subjects" are provided with a description of a
cognitive dissonance experiment (e.g. forced-compliance
\

paradigm) and are requested to make an estimate of th e .original
"participating-subjects" attitude ratings, on scales provided
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at the end of the description.
A controversy has developed concerning the information
that should he provided to the "observer-subjects" in an
’’interpersonal simulation”.

Bern's critics have stated that

if the original experiment is to be truly simulated or
replicated in an interpersonal context,

"observer-subjects"

must be provided with the "participating-subjects" premanipulation
attitude,

Bern, through his theory, maintains that premanipulation

attitude of the "particupating-subject" is "non-salient" to
postmanipulation phenomenlogy and thus irrelevant information
as far as an "observer-subject" is concerned.
The present study employs a partial replication of Bern
and McConnell's (1970) experiments and tests the "salience"
of premanipulation attitude by asking Ss to recall their initial
attitude position (expressed one week previously) after they
have engaged in counterattitudinal behaviour of a "forcedcompliance" experiment.

Following Bern and McConnell (1970),

recall of initial attitude error was taken as an indication
of the degree of salience of premanipulation attitude to the
experiment.
The major thesis of the study was that recall error would
vary as the degree of "importance" of the manipulated attitude
varied for the S.

"Importance" was operationally defined in

two wayss the relevance of the attitude for the S and the S's
strength of commitment to the attitude.

The results demonstrate

that Ss for whom the attitude-issue was highly important made
significantly less recall error than low importance subjects
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or controls.

This suggests that when a premanipulation

attitude is important to a S, this attitude then remains a
salient factor in a forced-compliance experiment.

Furthermore,

high importance Ss engaging in a separate forced-compliance
experiment with the typical attitude change measure as the
outcome variable show greater (though nonsignificant) attitude
change than low importance Ss and controls.

The difference

were nonsignificant when the major analytical design was
applied to the data; a 2 2 analysis of covariance.

However,

a simple analysis of variance (thus including variance due to
the covariant initial attitude position) computed on the data
with strength of commitment as the independent variable
produced a significant main effect.

This was a main effect

due to comparison of the levels of strength of commitment.
Simple effects analysis indicate this main effect was due to
a significant difference in amount of attitude change between
the two experimental treatment conditions.

Thus, high strength

of commitment experimental Ss made significantly greater
attitude change than low strength of commitment experimentals,
when variance due to difference in intial attitude position
was included in the statistical comparison of unadjusted means.
From this one might infer that the high salience level of
initial attitude for the high importance group, tends to
increase dissonance and encourage stronger dissonance reducing
behaviour.
These results are non-supportive of Bern's position and
suggest that premanipulation attitude is a salient feature of
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a forced-compliance experiment's phenomenology for some
individuals - namely, those for whom the particular attitude
is important.

Within the cognitive dissonance framework the

results suggest that those Ss for whom the attitude is important
do not reduce the dissonance by shifting their attitude and
then simply forgetting their premanipulation attitude.
Apparently they both shift their attitude after the experimental
manipulation and yet can still recall their premanipulation
attitude.
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SCALES

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX A-l
Scales of First Session Designed to
Assess Initial Attitude Position and the Levels of
the Independent Variables

Issue #1
How much control should students have over
the kinds of courses offered at their school?
ATTITUDE POSITION SCALE
(What is your position on the above issue?)
1
1
1
No
Very
Little
Control Little
Control
Control

.1.
1
Some
Much
Control Control
•

1
Very
Much
Control

1
Complete
Control

STRENGTH OF ATTITUDE COMMITMENT SCALE
(How strong do you feel your commitment to your position on
this issue is?)
1
No
Comitment
At All

1
Very
Weak
Comitment

1
Weak
Comitment

1
1
Moderate Strong
ComitComitment
merit

1
Very
Strong
Comitment

1
Complete
Comitment

ATTITUDE RELEVANCE SCALE
(How often do you give consideration or think about this issue
in your day to day life?)
1
Never
Think
About
It

1
Very
Often
Think
About
It

_________

..........

Very
Seldom
Think
About
It

Seldom
Think
About
It

Sometimes
Think
About
It

Often
Think
About
It

___________
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,

,

1
Almost
Always
Think
About
It
,

,

APPENDIX A-2
Change Experiment - Scale to Assess Attitude Change

Please mark the following scales according to what best
represents your present feelings toward the issue of i How
much control should students have over the kinds of courses
offered at their school?
ATTITUDE POSITION SCALE
(What is your position on the above issue?)
1

No
Control

1

. 1. . . . . . . . 1. . . . . . .

Very
Little
Little Control
Control

.1

Some
Much
Control Control

.1

Very
Much
Control
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.1

Complete
Control

APPENDIX A-3

Recall Experiment - Scale to Assess Attitude Recall
In the first session, one week ago we asked your co
operation in a survey of student attitudes.
in the questionnaire concerned,;

One of the issues

How much control students

should have over the kinds of courses offered at their school?
Now we, want you to try and recall your feelings expressed
on the three scales toward the student control issue in the
first session, by marking the following scales in the same
places you did one week ago. .
ATTITUDE POSITION SCALE
(What was your position expressed one week ago 011 the above
issue?)
1
No
Control

1
1
Very
Little
Little Control
Control

...1
...1...
Some
Much
Control Control

1
Very
Much
Control
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1
Complete
Control

APPENDIX A-4

"Freedom of Choice" Scale for all Experimental Subjects
You have just written an essay taking a strong position
on the student control of courses issue.
Please indicate on the following scale how much freedom
of choice you feel that you had in choosing which side of the
issue to argue for in your essay.
No
Very
Freedom
Little
Of
Freedom
Choice
Of
Choice

Little
Freedom
Of
Choice

Some
Freedom
Of
Choice

Much
Freedom
Of.
Choice

Very
Much
Freedom
Of
Choice

9?
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Complete
Freedom
Of
Choice

APPENDIX B
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE STUDY
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Appendix B-l
Reproduction of Tabulated data of
Bern and McConnell (1970)
Table 1
Attitude Change produced by Forced-Compliance
as a Function of Freedom of Choice
'

Treatment

Choice (N=16)

(A)

No Choice (N=16)
Control (N = 16)

(B)
(C)

to Comply

Perception
of Choice

Initial
Attitude

Attitude
Change

26.3

37.0

-9.3

3.4

36.1

-2.8

--

38.6

+0.1

t

t

t

A versus B

3.70

1.00

1.98*

A versus C

--

1.00

2.89**

1.00

1.38

B versus C

*p <.06
**p <.01
***p< .001
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Bern & McConnell Data (cont’d)

Table 2

Attitude Recall Error produced by Forced-Compliance
as a Function of Freedom of Choice
to Comply

Treatment

Choice (N=15)

Perception
of Choice

(A)

No Choice (N=15)
Control (N=15)

(B)

39.1

-9.7

2.1

38.0

-3.2

39.0

-1.0

(C)

5.84***

A versus C
B versus C

Attitude
Recall Error

33.0

t

A versus B

Initial
Attitude

--

t

t

1.00

1.73*

1.00

2.54**

1.00

0.99

*p <.10
**p <.02
***p< .001
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Bern & McConnel Data (cont’d)

Table 3

Produet-moment Correlations between
Recall of Initial Attitudes and
Initial and Final Attitudes

Treatment

Recall versus
Initial Attitudes

Recall versus
Final Attitudes

t
(Difference

Choice (N=15)

+ .26

+ .98

10.05*

No Choice (N=15)

+ .71

+ .96

4.32*

Control (N=15)

+ .75

+ .57

*p <.001
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-1.33

APPENDIX B-2

Excerpt from Hays (1966), Statistics
for Psychologists re t Intercorrelation
Comparisons,

(pp. 576-577)

TESTING SIGNIFICANCE FOR INTERCORRELATIONS
Before we leave the topic of correlation, a word must be
said about significance tests for intercorrelations.
It is
quite common to find research in psychology where a number of
different variables are studied in the same sample, and all
sample intercorrelations are found among these variables. For
example, a study may concern three variables, Xi, X2 , and X3 ,
and values are found for ri2» rjj, and rzj. This in itself is
fine as a description of linear relations in the data, and is
the first step in virtually any multivariate analysis, such
as finding a multiple-regression equation or carrying out a
factor analysis.
However, one often finds the experimenter testing the
K
significance of each one of these (^) intercorrelations by the
method of Section 15.26, as though each one were based on a
different sample. The resulting significance levels are largely
meaningless, for reasons much like those making t tests for
all differences among a set of means a dubious procedure.
In
the first place, even for independent tests of significance,
when so many tests are carried out the probability that some
Type I errors are being made may be very high. Even worse,
the t tests for correlations are quite redundant and are not
statistically independent when carried out on a table of
intercorrelations. Consequently, the set of results can be
grossly misleading. In particular, one should ordinarily
expect more than (g) a such tests to show significance by
chance alone.
It is simple to illustrate that restrictions exist in a
table of intercorrelations. Consider a sample of N cases, each
of which gives three scores, Xi, X2, and X3 , Imagine that ri2
turns out to be - ,80 and r^o is also - ,80, What is the
smallest value that r23 can be? In this instance, it is not
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possible for r23 to be - 1 ,00, or - .8, or - .5 i or indeed,
any negative value at all. The very smallest value that r23
can show for these data is .10, Fixing the value of two of
the correlations determines the necessary lower limit for the
third. The values of intercorrelations are dependent upon
each other in a given sample.
K
In general, for K variables, the average of the Q )
intercorrelations among these variables must be greater than
(or equal to) ~l/(K - 1), It follows that given the values of
some of the intercorrelations, the average lower limit for all
the other correlations is not - 1, but some number greater than
- 1, The larger K is, the closer this lower limit comes to 0.
Hence, it is somewhat pointless to treat each of the correlations
in turn as though the sampling distribution of values could
extend from - 1 through + 1, when with each successive value
of r known from the sample the possible lower limit to the next
set of values is raised. One should either not test for
significance in the ordinary way in dealing with intercorrelations
found for a single sample, or he should 3.nterpriT~th¥~signir
ficanc'e
levels with considerable latitude.
It is rather-hard to see why anyone would want to know if
all the true intercorrelations among a set of variables are
zero anyway. If these variables are to be used to predict some
other variable, then a test of significance for
is much more
meaningful. If some other regression method is contemplated,
appropriate tests may also exist for the results of applying
this method, Traeing relationships among variables is the
legitimate business of the scientist, but simply asking if
anything relates linearly to anything else in a large set of
variables is a pretty crude way to do business.
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APPENDIX C - RAW DATA BY EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION
Change Experiment - Subjects Devided on Attitude Relevance
Experimental Conditions
Low Relevance
l'
o

ject

1.
2.
3.
4,
5.
6,
7.
8.
9.
10,

High Relevance

Freedom
Relevance Change of Choice Commitment
23
12
12
11
20
12
23
3
21
11

+5
-18
-3
-7
-9
+17
-13
-10
-23
-10

50
46
59
1
60
60
41
41
15
33

33
35
32
36
.'20
23
31
41
20
11

Freedom
Strength
Subject Relevance Change of Choice Commitment
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16,
17.
18..
J- S 9

20.

41
42
52
35
35
54
43
36
38
35

-2
-20
-32
-21
-31
-30
-33

41
35
36
35
40
45
50
4-1
51
41
35
42
51.
45
50

+19
+12
-7
+4
+7
+24
-16
-fl
+7
-2
-1
-7
-7

+8
0

3
12
59
41
59
38
60
30
22
58

52
42
43
41
44
42
54
42
33
48

Control Condition
*
J» 9

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
2?.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

21
11
21
21
3
25
24
20
5
13
. 10
11
11
4
13

+21
+25
-6
+13
-16
+2
0
-10
-6
+3
0
0
-1
-3
0

38
1
41
41
31
59
34
20
11
25
10
31
23
22
34

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

+1

0

33
38
33
36
31
35
52
52
53
4o
35
42
59
45
40

o

Experimental Condition
Low Relevance

High Relevance

Recall Freedom
Strength of
Subject Relevance Error of Choice Commitment
1.
2,
4.
5.
6,
7.
8,
9.
10.
11.
12,

21
16
-8
20
11
23
21
13
25
23
25
22

0
-6
-id
-2
-1
-20
+1
-20
-10
-1
-22
-9

59
36
38
25
50
24
60

52
51
31
57
k9

kl
kl
27
31
31
23
k8
kk
21
k6
29
22
C(

25.
26.
27,
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

10
19
18
5
24
2k
22
11
12
11
■ 11
10
11
23
11

+lj.
+2
-10
-7
-k
+7
-1
+1
+6
+4
+7
+4
-1
-1

25
35
36
k2
39
k2
k2
k?
36
k9
21
11
41
43
22

Recall Freedom
Strength of
Subject Relevance Error of Choice Commitment
13.
14.
15.
16,
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
2k,

43
36
45
36
36
k5
k2
50
ko
48
ko
36

-20
-4'
-5
+9
0
+6
+5
+7
-8
+7
-2
-4

35
37
38
36
38
40
42
4?
51
38
43
35
35
38
51

0
-2
+7
+4
+7
+4
0
-9
+6
-2
-1
-2
-14
-14
-13

43
32
52
38
25
47
43
2
60
1
60
53

45
29
45
45
43
49
43
40
30
25
45
25

lition
ko.
kl.
k2.
^3kk.
45.
k6.
k7.
48.
k9.
50.
51.
52.
53.
5k,

44
43
28
33
30
46
42
54
42
4l
52
41
37
46
30

ffOl
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Recall Experiment - Subjects Devided on Attitude Relevance

APPilTDIX D

ADDITIONAL

AJjXPES
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APPKTDIX B-l
Further Analysis and Discussion of the Correlation
Between Initial Position and Attitude Change

The possibility that the significant correlation
(-.38 p.<.01) between initial attitude position and
attitude change resulted from a "ceiling effect" was
considered.

Thus, it is possible that 2s who scored at

the high end of the initial position scale were prevented
from changing in an even more extreme positive direction
because of a lack of room on the scale in the positive
direction (towards 60).

Of the entire change experiment

S sample (50) 16 Os ranked their initial position above
45.

Of these 16, 12 Ss changed their final attitude

position by moving down on the scale, rather than re
maining at the same position or moving up (towards 60).
Only two Ss (1 experimental, 1 control) had scored so
high (60 and 59 respectively) that they could not eff
ectively change in a positive direction.

Both of these

Ss changed by moving down on the scale (towards 0) —
or in other words, in a dissonance reducing direction.
If these data are broken down into experimental Ss
versus control Ss it is found that 7 (of 20) experimental
treatment Ss ranked their initial attitude position
above 45 on the scale.

Only 1 ox the seven changed in a

positive direction (45 to 50) and 1 remained the same.
All others changed in the negative direction after
counterattitudinal nan initiation.

In the control 6 samolc
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9 Ss ranked themselves initially above 4-5 on the attitude
position scale.

Of these 9 Ss, 2 changed in a positive

direction and 1 S remained the same,

ihus, 6 control Ss

above the 45 position changed in a downward direction.
Since only 2 Ss were actually in a situation where
they could not score higher on the scale in the final
attitude position assessment and neither of these Ss
remained the same but instead showed a dissonance effect,
a "ceiling effect" bias is not a viable explanation of
the significant correlation between initial attitude
position and attitude change.

Moreover, there were sign

ificant differences in attitude change when experinentals
were compared to controls (the dissonance effect).

Ihus,

no general tendency for high scoring Ss to change in a
negative direction appears to have brought about the
dissonance phenomena.
In summary, it seems that virtually all Ss were
effectively able to change in either direction or remain
the same at the second assessment of attitude position
and in fact they all v?ith 14 exceptions changed in a dis
sonance reducing direction,

fhe ramifications of the

correlation between attitude position and attitude change
are r o d —

la at is, the negative correlation tends to

counter Bern's assumption regarding the non-salience of
preraonipulation attitudes.
One other issue v/ith regard to this significant
correlation remains to be considered.

It seems that 5s
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with extreme positions (above 45) on the initial position
scale tended to change in a negative direction on the
final position assessment in both the experimental and
control conditions.

This shift then, could have been an

artifact of a "regression towards the mean" phenomenon
for extreme initial position 3s.

i'o establish if the

greater change for the experimental 3s with extreme
initial positions was really due to dissonance•effects
and not a result of regression to the mean effect a t
test was computed comparing the 5 experimental Ss with
extreme initial positions who changed in a negative dir
ection, to the 6 controls with extreme initial positions
who changed in a negative direction,

the result indic

ates a statistically significant difference (t=2.32 £ < . 05)
in the mean change scores for the two extreme initial
position groups.

I'his result effectively eliminates a

regression to the mean phenomena as a factor in producing
the dissonance results evident when comparing extreme
initial position Ss of the two treatment conditions.
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Change E x p e r i m e n t : S u m m a r y of .-analysis of V ar ia n c e with
At titude Relev an ce the In dependent Vari abl es

Source

df

ihS

V

p

A (Treatments)

1

2251.2873

15.8725

.001

B (Relevance)

1

218.5819

1.5411

U.S.

AB (Interaction)

1

315.918?

2.2274

i->•LJ *

46'

141.8361

Error

o

A simple 2 x 2 analysis of variance design which includes
variance due to the covariant initial position was comp
uted. This computation did not change the nature of the
results as analyzed with a 2 x 2 analysis of covariance.
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